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Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy:
Standing on the Outside Looking In
NATALIE D. MARTIN*
In this Article, Professor Martin challenges traditional notions of
bankrnttcy court standing and concludes that the current majority view of such
standing, which limits participation in bankruptcy cases to persons with
pecuniary interests or claims in the debtor, is too narrow. Professor Martin
reviews current case law, statutory law, and bankrptcy policy, and asks
whether the people who are regularly granted the right to be heard in
bankruptcy cases are the same people who are substantially affected by
bankritcy cases. Ultimately, she concludes that limiting standing to persons
with pecuniary rights fails to provide a voice to all people substantially affected
by bankruptcy cases. In so concluding, she identifies situations in which unique
bankruptcy entitlements permit debtors and creditors to shift financial losses to
third parties, some of whom are not even parties to the bankruptcy proceeding
and who thus have no opportunity to protect their rights in these cases.
Professor Martin goes on to explore the practical ramifications of
expanding standing, recognizing that bankruptcy courts may not be well-
equipped to address "nonpecuniary" claims. She argues that caisidering
nonpecuniary interests is economically efficient because it preserves existing
social, economic, and familial structures. She argues that, because a truly
accurate economic analysis must measure notjust present dollars, but all things
that we value as a society, there really are no such things as "noneconomic"
or "nonpecuniary" interests. She further argues that typical Law and
Economics models used in bankruptcy underestimate the societal costs of
business failure and displacement and assign no value to the human elements of
life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whose business is Chapter 11 anyway? Whose business is it when a huge
plant closes its doors and, within weeks or even days, the company is sold to
another company that will operate it in another state? Would employees, for
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example, find this interesting? Would residents of a nursing home be interested
to know that as a result of a decision in the nursing home's Chapter 11 case,
they would soon need to find other housing? Obviously, these questions reflect
other, larger questions. Is Chapter 11 a primarily private matter between a
bankruptcy debtor and those parties who hold cognizable bankruptcy claims
and causes of action against the debtor? Or does Chapter 11 have broader
public and societal implications?
During the 1980s and early 1990s, shortly after Chapter 11 was enacted by
Congress, most bankruptcy scholars argued that bankruptcy involved only
private financial relationships between finite groups of private parties, and that
consequently bankruptcy courts should consider only these private financial
matters.I Only recently has any scholar suggested that Chapter 11 bankruptcies
may have more far-reaching public and societal implications.2 These recent
suggestions are beginning to power an active debate about the role of Chapter
11 rehabilitation in society.
Regardless of how one answers these questions, no one can deny that
bankruptcy reorganizations have played a far larger role in society in recent
years than they have in the past.3 Moreover, specific bankruptcy laws give
1 See Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankrptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs.
173, 184 (1987); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARv. L. REV. 775 (1988) (describing the goal of Chapter 11 as determining how to divide
the pie among creditors); Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and
Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1088 (1992) (arguing that bankruptcy is a death
penalty for all parties because it does not work for debtors and it keeps creditors from being
paid); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 319 (1991)
(arguing that the costs of Chapter 11 are not justified by the small number of successful
cases).
2 See generally KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FoRGivENEss: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUircy SYSTEM (1997) (discussing broad societal ramifications of bankruptcy cases);
see also Donald R. Korobldn, Rehabilitation Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 717, 725 (1991) (arguing that some scholars define bankniptcy's purpose
too narrowly); Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Proper Role of the
Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783, 787-89 (1995) (arguing that bankruptcy cases often
involve societal interests that are broader than the interests represented in the case); Julie A.
Veach, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy: Looking to the Railroads for
Answers, 72 IND. L.J. 1211 (1997) (discussing consideration of public interests in
reorganization cases).
3 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 11 in 1978, bankruptcy courts filled the role of bean
counters' arbiter, separating legitimate and illegitimate claims and splitting up the goodies
among the deserving. This limited role was developed in cases such as In re Johns-Manville,
36 B.R. 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), In re Texaco Inc., 84 B.R. 893 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988), In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 185 B.R. 302 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995), and others in
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bankruptcy debtors and creditors rights they would not have outside
bankruptcy.4 These specific provisions-including limited notice periods, the
automatic stay, and certain sale provisions-inadvertently harm certain other
interests including, for example, interests of employees, adjoining landowners,
and other parties who do not have a strictly economic relationship with the
debtor.5
One reason that certain interests are inadvertently harmed by Chapter 11
cases is that most bankruptcy courts have allowed only persons with a present
economic interest6 in the debtor or in the debtor's assets to be heard in
which Chapter 11 relief was sought. This limited role was relatively effective when
bankruptcies, especially reorganizations, were anomalous. Because large reorganization cases
are more common under the new Code and provide corporate debtors with more entitlements,
this limited role is problematic.
Today, consumer bankruptcies are far more common that in the past, while mega-cases
are less common than they were a decade ago. See Mark Binker, Bankruptcy Filings
Overwhelm Court in Maryland: Caseload Increases from 10,311 in 1990 to 24,327 in 1996,
BALTIMORE SuN, Nov. 2, 1997, at 148 (noting that consumer bankruptcy filings in Maryland
are up 33.6% in part because lenders extend more credit to businesses that traditionally would
not qualify); see also John Accola, Bankrutcy Bandwagon, ROCKY MTN. NEWs (Colo.),
Nov. 9, 1997, at 1G (noting similar increases across the country, but looking only at statistics
for personal bankruptcies); Bankruptcy Code Needs 7ghtening, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 26,
1997, at 6 (noting that businesses borrow and use credit differently now that credit is so
readily available).
4 For example, 11 U.S.C. § 547 allows the trustee or debtor in possession to recover a
transfer of property made within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing, and 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
allows a debtor to reject any executory contract or unexpired lease that the debtor finds
unprofitable. See In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 230 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
On the other hand, many state law rights remain the same in bankruptcy and, according to
some scholars, differences between substantive rights available inside and outside bankruptcy
should be minimized. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forun Shopping, and
Banknptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 815, 827-28 (1987). Otherwise, parties
will be encouraged to file for bankruptcy when it is otherwise inefficient for them to do so.
See id. Needless to say, however, bankruptcy does create some substantive rights which can
in tam hurt persons outside the case. Although Professor Baird and others can argue that
these problems must be dealt with through nonbankruptcy law, these results are caused by
unique bankruptcy entitlements and, thus, must be dealt with in bankruptcy and not
elsewhere.
5 See GRoss, supra note 2, at 22.
6 Economic rights that are presently in existence are pecuniary; future economic rights
are not. Under most case law, only present economic rights, or "pecuniary rights," are
recognized in bankruptcy. But see infra Part ll.C.2 (discussing exceptions recognized under
existing law). From this point on in this Article, I use the word "nonpecuniary" to express the
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bankruptcy cases.7 The Bankruptcy Code does not impose this limitation.8
Rather, courts themselves have judicially developed this limited approach to
bankruptcy court standing. 9
In this Article, I argue that there is no justification for providing bankruptcy
court standing only to persons with current economic interests. I provide three
examples of groups of individuals whose noneconomic interests could be
adversely affected by a company's bankruptcy: 1) persons who are being
involuntarily released from a nursing home or similar facility because the
debtor has found more profitable clientele; 2) persons whose jobs are being
eliminated through a bankruptcy sale; and 3) persons who live in a
neighborhood in which a former restaurant-bar is being sold to a strip joint.
Most of these people would not have bankruptcy court standing under the
current majority view, and consequently their interests would never be heard in
a typical bankruptcy case. I argue that interests such as these should be heard
by bankruptcy courts and that standing should be conferred upon anyone with a
substantial interest in the bankruptcy case and not merely upon those with a
present "financial" interest. 10
This Article also explores the alternative methods of providing a voice to
these interests and ultimately concludes that, at a minimum, we should provide
standing to these interests to determine how society's interests are being
affected by large Chapter 11 cases. Only by determining what these effects are
can we learn whether these interests are being harmed, and if so, how best to
protect them.
concept of a right that is either not strictly economic or that is economic but not presently in
existence.
7 See Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1979); see also In re A-1
Trash Pick-up, Inc., 57 B.R. 380, 383 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that the U.S. Trustee
has standing).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994). Under § 1109, any "party in interest" has a right to be
heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case. Id. Because courts narrowly interpret "party-in-
interest" to mean a person with a pecuniary interest in the debtor or its assets, however, these
courts deny persons without such a financial interest standing. See In re Hathaway Ranch
Partnership, 116 B.R. 208, 213 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); see also In re Farmer, 786 F.2d
618 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a Chapter 7 trustee was not a party in interest because
trustee had no financial interest); In re Kutner, 3 B.R. 422 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980) (stating
that standing requires a pecuniary interest directly affected by the proceeding or a direct
financial interest in the estate being administered). But see infra Part II.C.2.a (discussing
treatment of future asbestos claims).
9 See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 850-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(discussing need to limit bankruptcy court standing for prudential reasons).
10 See GRoss, supra note 2, at 228-29.
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In Part II of this Article, I discuss whether reorganization can actually
benefit society. First, I review a current debate in bankruptcy regarding
whether reorganization provides any benefit to society at all. Because some
scholars advocate eliminating Chapter 11 entirely, it may seem counterintuitive
to expand the reorganization forum. I argue, however, that Chapter 11 serves
the Bankruptcy Code's rehabilitative goals. Rather than doing away with
Chapter 11, we need to maintain it, while making it more responsible for and
accountable to society and its needs. Reorganization is here to stay; it merely
needs to be restructured to respond to its larger role in society.
Second, I address Chapter 11 debtors' fiduciary responsibilities in a
reorganization, concluding that a corporation's fiduciary responsibilities in
Chapter 11 run not only to creditors and stockholders, but also to other interests
as well. 11 I conclude that recognizing these fiduciary responsibilities supports a
broader approach to bankruptcy court standing.
Finally, I analyze the current law with respect to bankruptcy court
standing, concluding that the existing statutory standing standard permits courts
to consider a greater variety of interests than many courts currently consider,
and that changes in society and in the use of bankruptcy require a more
expansive notion of standing.
Part III of this Article illustrates noneconomic or future economic interests
that can be adversely affected by a Chapter 11 case, and discusses possibilities
for considering these interests. First, I offer examples of noneconomic interests
for which the persons affected would have no right to be heard under the
majority view of standing. These examples illustrate how damaging a very
limited view of standing can be and how it can produce unfavorable
consequences to innocent people. 12 I examine one of these examples, the
American worker's inability to be heard in cases on issues affecting his future
employment, and conclude that workers should have statutorily prescribed
standing to speak on this issue. I conclude that a failure specifically to provide
this standing further exacerbates the significant downward spiral in job status
and wages that American workers already are experiencing.
In addition, I discuss the broader ramifications of expanding bankruptcy
court standing and consider the options courts ultimately may have in
addressing the issues raised by persons holding noneconomic interests. I argue
that taking a broader view of standing would be economically efficient and
11 Such interests include those of employees, suppliers, local businesses, and even the
community as a whole.
12 Some of these consequences are actually caused by the bankruptcy system itself,
which makes the situation even more unfair.
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propose limitations to preclude these nonpecuniary interests from becoming a
significant burden on the reorganization process. 13
Finally, in Part IV of this Article, I conclude that, beyond economic
efficiency, it is socially desirable for bankruptcy courts to hear and consider the
societal goals discussed in this Article.14 I conclude that a far greater economic
and social waste occurs when this is not done, thereby justifying a departure
from the limitations imposed by current judicially-created standing law.
II. CAN REORGANIZATION BENEFIT SOCmTY?
Scholars disagree about whether Chapter 11 reorganization can provide any
benefit to society at all. Whether it can depends upon the answers to some very
fundamental questions. Does Chapter 11 serve any societal goals, and if so,
which goals? To whom does a corporate debtor owe a fiduciary responsibility?
Upon whom does the bankruptcy proceeding have a significant effect, and of
those persons, who has a right to be heard in a bankruptcy case?
A. Identifying the Contours of Bankruptcy Policy
"To be or not to be" 15 is the question some scholars are asking about
bankruptcy law. The very existence of this area of the law as a separate
discipline has recently been called into question. 16 Included in this inquiry is a
large-scale attack on Chapter 11 reorganization, which has been criticized as
13 These issues include the sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets and
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, among other things.
14 1 ultimately conclude that efficiency and social desirability are equivalent goals
because social desirability is efficient.
15 WIRLxAM SHAKESpEARIE, HAmLr act 3, sc. 1.
16 See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Banknqtcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 312-13 (1993); Baird, supra note 4, at 824; Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986);
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Banknptcy Theory, and the
Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991) (arguing that
bankruptcy law offers little to justify its existence); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig,
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049-50 (1992) (arguing that
because equity holders rarely recover under Chapter 11, Chapter 11 should be repealed);
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankrptcy Sharing and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1980) (questioning the
incentives created by the current bankruptcy system); Jones, supra note 1, at 1089.
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wasteful and, in large part, ineffective. 17 In determining whether Chapter 11
reorganization should indeed exist, one must first ask what function this law
should serve.18
The traditional Law and Economics answer to this question is that
bankruptcy law should exist solely to "collectivize" debt collection and
maximize economic returns to creditors.19 Advocates of this approach use what
has been called a "common pool" analysis, which relies on the hypothesis of a
limited, finite pool of available assets20 and a fixed, identifiable number of
creditors who assert claims against the common pool.21 Under this model, each
creditor is seen as exchanging its rights in the debtor's property for payment
from the pool.22 Because of this hypothetical asset exchange, every bankruptcy
case, regardless of whether it is a reorganization or a liquidation, is perceived
as a sale.23
Current bankruptcy laws, however, were designed to do more than divvy
up the assets. 24 As Professor Donald Korobkin has noted: "Bankruptcy law's
reasons for being can be only as wide or narrow, critical or trivial, as the
17 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 780-81 (describing the numerous costs and
inefficiencies in the existing Chapter 11 reorganization system); Jones, supra note 1, at 1089-
92 (arguing, during a speech before The Federalist Society, that everyone involved would be
better off without Chapter 11 because it is usually unsuccessful, expensive, and does not
preserve asset values).
18 See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 725-26.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 727-28; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMIS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW,
1-6 (1986) (stating that bankruptcy law should be concerned only with maximizing the asset
and not with how those assets will be distributed).
21 See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 30; DOUGLAS BAiRD & THOMAS JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUpTCY 31-35 (1985).
2 2 See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 727.
2 3 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 776.
24 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 53-62 (Sept. 8, 1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6014-23
(letter from Judge Conrad Cyr responding to congressional request for information about
cases with special community impact); see also Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, H.R. REP. No. 93-197, pt. 1, at 72 (Sept. 6, 1973) (discussion of
the "overriding community goals and values" in bankruptcy); 124 CONG. REc. 32,392 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. 33,990 (Oct. 5, 1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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problem in response to which bankruptcy has developed." 25 The policies
behind Chapter 11 are consistently and repeatedly rehabilitative. 26 Thus, rather
than merely distributing assets, the central purpose of Chapter 11 is to reduce
the economic effect of financial disaster.27 This is an entirely different measure
from maximizing assets.28
25 Korobldn, supra note 2, at 725; see also Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm
of Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1055, 1078 (1994) (stating that the goal of bankruptcy is to
distribute the effects of failing businesses).
26 Moreover, Chapter 11 cases are to be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation only if
there is a "continuing loss or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood
of rehabilitation." 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)(1994); see also In re The Ledges Aparments, 58
B.R. 84, 87 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (finding an absence of reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation and thus converting the case); see also C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership v. Norton
Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership), 113 F.3d 1304, 1308 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing that a
partnership in dissolution can no longer be rehabilitated). Thus, as long as rehabilitation is
possible, it is clearly preferable to liquidation.
27 Professor Elizabeth Warren has noted:
Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code are liberally sprinlded with
discussions of policies to "protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save
troubled businesses," of concern about the community impact of bankruptcy, and of "the
public interest" beyond the interests of the disputing parties. These comments serve as
reminders that Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than the
immediate problems of debtors and their identified creditors; they indicate clear
recognition of the larger implications of a debtor's wide-spread default and the
consequences of permitting a few creditors to force a business to close.
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. Rev. 775, 788 (1987) (footnotes
omitted); see also James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Banknptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097, 2143
(1990) (arguing that maximizing assets alone does not achieve the maximum goals of Chapter
11; even if the assets are maximized, maximum efficiency can only be achieved if bankruptcy
losses also are minimized).
2 8 See Bowers, supra note 27, at 2143. Moreover, while maximizing assets is one way
to reduce the effects of economic disaster, Chapter 11 does not propose to do this through a
sale model. Where possible, values are to be maximized by realizing the "going concern"
premium or value for the continuing operation of a business. See Charles J. Tabb, The Future
of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 791, 809 (1993) (stating that the "mandatory sale system was
the form used in the old equity receiverships"). "Going back to a forced-sale regime would
require explaining why the concerns' that led to the demise of the equity
receivership... [would] no longer hold true." Id. This is why the sale model is so unnatural.
It appears to have been developed at a time when the current Chapter 11 did not exist, and
thus it does not reflect the realities of modem life surrounding Chapter 11. See id. In
connection with this idea, Professor Tabb quotes Professor Warren as saying, "[tihe
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Many Law and Economics scholars fully recognize bankruptcy's
rehabilitative function in individual bankruptcy cases,29 but do not consider
corporate reorganizations rehabilitative and do not believe that they have any
positive impact on society. 30 When Professor Karen Gross suggests that
bankruptcy cases have large implications for society as a whole, in her essay
entitled Taking Community Interests into Account,31 Judge Schermer dismisses
the notion as pure fiction.32 Similarly, three British scholars insist that greater
bankruptcy system matters. It mattered to a 10 billion dollar business like Federated, and it
mattered to their 80,000 employees who stayed on the job." Id. at 804 (quoting Elizabeth
Warren, The Untenable Case for the Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 478 (1992)).
The reality of Chapter 11 in modem life is that "a business is worth more alive than dead."
Tabb, supra at 804; see also Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy
Decisionmaldng, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 333, 365 (1992) ("Although the economic
account's method may be suited to solve a purely economic problem, it is entirely unsuited to
resolve practical conflicts among diverse and incommensurable values that pervade financial
distress.").
29 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 724 n.22 ("From the perspective of the
economic account, the fresh start policy is 'substantively unrelated to the creditor-oriented
distributional rules that give bankruptcy its general shape and complexity.' ... Nevertheless,
proponents of the economic account still recognize the fresh start policy as a 'key policy in
bankruptcy law.'") (quoting JACKSON, supra note 20, at 225, 227).
30 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 20, at 1-6; Baird, supra note 1, at 184. According to
Korobkin, however, a corporation is an enterprise that has a personality, and, like an
individual, it can change its personality. A corporation is like an individual debtor, a moral,
political, and social actor. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 745; see also GROSS, supra note 2,
at 98-103 (discussing the many benefits of rehabilitation, including economic and
humanitarian benefits); Warren, supra note 27, at 787 (discussing the rehabilitative goals of
Chapter 11).
31 72 WASH U. L.Q. 1031, 1039 (1994). As Professor Gross points out, the typical
ways Law and Economics addresses concerns about community interests is by ignoring them.
Whatever attention is paid to the issue is relegated to "below the line" notes in passing in the
footnotes. See id. at 1046-47.
32 Judge Schermer never even addresses the underlying issues. See Barry S. Schermer,
Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community into Account in
Bankruptcy-A Modem-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049 (1994). Judge
Schermer suggests that, similar to a group of mice that wishes to have a bell put around a
cat's neck but does not want to actually do it, community interests cannot be measured and
thus are unrealistic to even consider. See id. at 1050. He fears that a Pandora's box of
interests will be opened, and there will be no way to limit the huge number of potential claims
or determine how, if at all, to weigh their claims. See id. at 1051. Based on these problems,
he concludes that considering these potential interests is pure fiction. See id.. As discussed in
Part I.D., Judge Schermer is incorrect. It is possible to effectively limit the claims that can
be heard. In any event, Professor Gross is not afraid of Pandora's box, and in fact sees
opening it as part of a necessary process. See GRoss, supra note 2, at 197.
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social interests should not be promoted through bankruptcy laws but through
business subsidies and other mechanisms. 33 Such a suggestion makes far more
sense in the more socialist British business environment than under the
American model, which disfavors these subsidies as anticapitalist. Indeed, the
very need for such an extensive reorganization system flows from American
capitalism and its lack of other safety nets.34 In fact, it would be less drastic,
and more consistent with American law, to use the American bankruptcy
system to minimize large-scale losses, rather than to create business subsidies. 35
One common thread in the bankruptcy policies developed from Law and
Economics theories is that each policy espouses a single goal as being the
purpose of all bankruptcy laws.36 Despite these simple hypotheses, however,
there is nothing simple about bankruptcy policy or the societal issues to which it
must respond.37 Nor is there one goal in devising a bankruptcy scheme.38 If
33 See Phil ipe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedures, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
849, 852 n.7 (1994) (noting that bankruptcy is the wrong instrument for dealing with external
considerations such as maintaining employment in a local community, and that it would be
more preferable to have a general employment subsidy to save jobs than to distort bankruptcy
procedures).
34 See Warren, supra note 27, at 779 (discussing how contract laws can themselves be
more strict because bankruptcy provides a method of escaping contractual obligations).
35 See H. VAARN, MCROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 111-15 (2d ed. 1984).
36 See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 32; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 16, at 1043.
According to Jackson and Baird, that one goal is to collect and distribute assets; I call this the
"collectively divide" goal. It is distinguished from state law only because it is a collective,
rather than individual, effort. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 31-35; Baird, supra note 16, at
130. According to Bradley and Rosenzweig, the single goal in a Chapter 11 reorganization is
to maximize returns to shareholders and bondholders. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
16, at 1088-89. Actually, their study limits the goal to maximizing returns to "public"
shareholders and bondholders, virtually ignoring all privately-owned enterprises. Yet this goal
is inconsistent with many bankruptcy code provisions, including § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which
provides that creditors must be paid before shareholders can receive a distribution under the
plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). This "maximize retun to investors" goal, the
philosophical opposite of the "collectively divide" goal, is but one goal nonetheless. Its
narrow nature makes the solution-in their case to the problem of low returns to shareholder
and bondholders-equally simple: repeal Chapter 11; after all, it's useless as judged by its
sole goal.
37 See Warren, supra note 27, at 811. Professor Warren has expressed her view of
bankruptcy as "a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view... from which [she] can
neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a
policy decision." Id.; see also Rapoport, supra note 2, at 815-16 (explaining that under at
least some views of bankruptcy policy, bankruptcy decisions are complicated by a number of
ethical and societal issues).
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there was, many of the current Bankruptcy Code provisions, which address a
huge array of societal concerns, would not exist. 39 Moreover, despite scholarly
debate about whether there should be a Chapter 11, it seems unlikely that
Chapter 11 will be repealed.4°
This is not to say, however, that Chapter l's rehabilitative goals should be
used to hurt important and legitimate rights of third parties, some of whom are
not even a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. 41 To the contrary, Chapter l's
rehabilitative goals run not merely to the reorganizing company, its creditors,
and shareholders, but also to third party interests.
B. Corporate Social Responsibilities in Chapter 11: The Debtor's Role
in Recognizing Noneconomic Interests
Corporations, both inside and outside bankruptcy, gain advantages from
legal systems perpetuated by the government and the public.42 In exchange for
these advantages, corporations should be held responsible and accountable to
the public.43 Under the "entity" theory, 44 a corporation has separate fiduciary
38 See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text (discussing the many Bankruptcy Code
provisions that further broad goals other than maximizing returns to creditors); see also
Rapoport, supra note 2, at 837-43 (discussing the intersection of bankruptcy law with
criminal law and environmental law).
39 See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
40 See Tabb, supra note 28, at 862.
41 See generally Rapoport, supra note 2. Professor Rapoport recognizes throughout her
article that there can be many unrepresented parties in a typical bankruptcy case.
42 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are the Corporate Manager's Trustees?, 45
H v. L. REv. 1145, 1148 (1932); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility:
What it Might Mean If lt Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. REv. 557, 559 (1986).
43 See Dodd, supra note 42, at 1148; Stone, supra note 42, at 559; John C. Coates,
Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 873-76 (1989).
44 The entity theory describes the corporation as a legal person that is separate and
distinct from its shareholders. See David Millon, Theories ofthe Corporation, 201 DuKE L.J.
201, 216 (1990). The corporate entity is considered an artificial creation of the state, and not
of private individuals. See id. Because the corporation is separate and distinct from its
shareholders and was not created by its shareholders but by the state, it owes obligations not
just to its shareholders but to others as well. These others could include employees, suppliers,
and even the public at large. See id. Under this theory of the corporation, the corporation is
allowed to consider interests other than those of its shareholders, and is even free to make
decisions that might harm its shareholders in order to benefit others. See Michael J. Phillips,
Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1061, 1067
(1994).
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obligations to other members of the community, including employees, suppliers
and even communities as a whole. Under this theory, shareholder profit
maximization is not management's sole concern.
While recognition of corporate fiduciary responsibilities is far from
universal, 45 the theory behind recognizing social responsibilities in corporations
is simple. A corporation that at least considers the public interest in making
decisions is less likely to cause harm to society. Some corporations may even
take action that is beneficial to society, and it is difficult to see how this could
45 There are many theories of the corporation and the "entity" theories are admittedly a
minority view. The Artificial Entity theory views the corporation as a legal person, existing
separately from its shareholders. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 636-37 (1819) (describing the corporation as an entity that is an "artificial being,
invisible and intangible" and separate from its shareholders); J. ANGELL & S. AMEs,
TEATSE ON TiE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNs AGGREGATE 1 (9th ed. 1870) (describing
the corporation as a "body, created by law.... for certain purposes, considered as a natural
person").
The Natural Entity theory views the corporation as a creation of private initiative rather
than state power and as deriving its power from its shareholders. See The Railroad Tax
Cases, 13 F. 722, 747-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (advocating looking at the corporation as the
people that compose it). The Corporate Responsibility theory is an extension of the natural
entity theory and views the corporation as having a public obligation to be a good citizen. This
view includes the interests of shareholders, employees, and even the public at large. See
Dodd, supra note 42, at 1146; James Boyd White, How Should We Talk About Corporations?
The Language of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YAE L.J. 1416, 1418 (1985).
The Shareholder Primacy Aggregate theory argues that the role of the management of
the corporation is that of trustee for the shareholders because the corporation is really an
aggregate of the shareholders and management. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.");
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of
Shareholder Gain-A Survey of and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988) ("The bedrock principle of U.S. Corporate law remains that
maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for managerial decisionmaking.").
The Contractarian or New Economic theory views the corporation as a nexus of
contracts. The interrelation of those contracts determines the rights of the various individuals
involved. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972) (analyzing the agency cost
perspective of the corporate form); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON L. REv. Summer 1989, at 99.
The Broad Aggregate theory conceives of the firm as an aggregate of more than just
shareholders and management, but also employees and suppliers. See Millon, supra note 44,
at 225-28.
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be bad.46 Moreover, we are entitled to accountability from corporations, which
enjoy power and wealth as a result of limited liability principles and other legal
constructs.47 Too often, however, such responsibilities are unrecognized or
ignored. As one scholar has noted:
[O]ver the last century the corporation has gained an extraordinary legislative
and Judicial status, receiving almost the full spectrum of legal rights of an
individual. This process completes the inverse of purpose (corporations created
to serve the public good) and values: from property rights as a tool to
safeguard individual autonomy to property's assumption of (individual)
autonomy and the subordination of individual and community to the needs of
corporations.48
While recognition of corporate fiduciary responsibilities is still somewhat
rare, it is not a purely academic phenomenon.49 Shareholder constituency
statutes, which permit or require corporate directors to consider interests of the
corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, the national economy,
and even long-term community and societal goals, have been adopted in more
than half of the states.50 The rationale behind these statutes is similar to the
rationale for recognizing broader interests in bankruptcy:
46 For example, consider the corporation that is not required to do so but decides to
install an extra antipollution device on a piece of farm equipment. The government is
considering making the device mandatory but has not done so. Using this device
unquestionably will reduce immediate and even perhaps long-term profits. Yet, as a society,
we want to encourage this type of activity.
47 Corporations obtain these advantages from the government, which acts as an agent for
the public. Thus, corporations should be responsible to the public. See Rachel Geman,
Safeguarding Employee Rights in a Post-Union World: A New Conception of Employee
Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 369, 377-78 (1997).
48 Richard Healey, Toward a New Social Accord 3 (unpublished paper on file with the
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems), cited in Geman, supra note 47, at 377-78.
49 See Ira M. Milistein, The Responsible Board, 52 Bus. LAw. 407 (1997) (claiming
that in order to retain their privileges in society, corporations must balance societal interests
with the goal of maximizing shareholder profit).
50 For catalogues of these statutes, see John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson,
Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 1425, 1540-45 (1991) (appendices summarizing 29 statutes); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TIx. L. REV. 579 n.1 (1992) (listing 28 statutes); Steven M.H. Wallman, The
Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties,
21 STmSON L. REV. 163, 194-96 (1991) (listing 28 statutes).
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The increasing recognition of the modem corporation's profound effect on the
lives of a variety of groups not traditionally within the corporate law structure
has the potential to lead corporate law into the next century in a manner more
reflective of the role that this type of organization actually plays in our
society. 51
Even Wall Street, the bastion of shareholder profit maximization, has
acknowledged corporate responsibilities in some form.52 According to one Wall
Street attorney, corporations must balance the goal of maximizing shareholder
profits with the needs of society.53 This is particularly true in the United States,
where the government is less involved in addressing social concerns than in
many other advanced economies. 54 Rather than "do gooder" ethical advice, this
Wall Street attorney believes that corporate responsibility is simply a reality of
America's highly privatized economic system. 55 Under this view, corporations
that fail to recognize their social responsibilities will not be sustainable over the
long term. 56
Of course, many scholars deny that corporations have any social
responsibility to the public. To many, the idea places social obligations on
entities that are unable to balance the resulting competing goals.57 Scholars also
51 Mitchell, supra note 50, at 584. Moreover, corporations are increasingly mobile and
control far more wealth than ever before. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatization of Public
Wealth, 23 FORDHAm URB. L.J. 101, 111 (1995). In fact, more than a quarter of the world's
economic activity is generated by the 200 largest corporations, which causes corporations to
be "less accountable to workers and communities." Id.
52 See generally Millstein, supra note 49, at 407 (acknowledging, in his role as Wall
Street corporate lawyer, that corporations have fiduciary responsibilities to parties other than
shareholders).
53 See id. at 408.
54 See id. These social factors are considered "extrinsic" because they fall outside the
traditional goal of profit maximization. Paying attention to these extrinsic factors, however,
will reduce government intervention and intrusion. See id. In other words, do it yourself or be
told how to do it by the government.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 410, 412. As Millstein explains, "integration of extrinsics-the
corporation's efforts to balance societal concerns of employees, customers, suppliers, and
communities, without compromising shareholder wealth-[is] central to the perpetuation of
the corporation and our system. . . ." See id. at 410. Moreover, "[tfor the corporation to be
allowed to continue to enjoy its place and privilege," it must integrate intrinsics. See id. at
412.
57 To these scholars, it is far too difficult for management to balance the needs of both
shareholders on the one hand and creditors, suppliers, and employees on the other. Too often,
these constituents' goals will be inconsistent, making it impossible for the managers to know
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have argued that shareholder constituency statutes are not enacted to protect the
public but to help incumbent management avoid job displacement.58 Scholars
have further argued that these statutes, many of which are drafted as
antitakeover statutes, improperly protect jobs and nonshareholder interests at
the expense of shareholders. 59 Consideration of other interests, however, may
create benefits in other parts of the economy.60 In other words, these alleged
losses ultimately may produce a desirable result, even for the same
shareholders.61
what to do. See Butler, supra note 45, at 99; Davis, supra note 45, at 8. But see Thomas Lee
Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C.
L. REv. 273, 283-84 (1991) (recognizing that even shareholders and managers often have
divergent interests, and that this alone does not preclude managers from acting in
shareholders' best interests).
58 See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 393, 399
(1993).
59 See id. It is not clear that these losses to shareholders have occurred, or that it would
be improper if they had.
60 See WniuAm WOLMAN & ANNE COLAMOSCA, THE JUDAS ECONOMY: DE TRIUMPH
OF CAPrrAL AND THE BEM YAL OF WORK 82-85, 111-12 (1997) (noting that consideration of
the rights and status of workers would increase productivity).
61 See id. at 29 (discussing how the rosh of American corporations to hire cheaper
foreign labor has increased profits but reduced the standard of living of most Americans).
Preventing some corporate profits in favor of other societal goals could be economically
efficient. This is not to say that all scholars would recognize these results as efficient. What is
efficient depends upon what is measured over what period of time and upon whether
efficiency is measured in terms of global or more individual wealth maximization. Either
way, the notion that corporations have fiduciary responsibilities appears to be alive and well.
See generally Millstein, supra note 49, at 413-15 (arguing that, if corporate fiduciary
responsibilities are not recognized, corporations may lose some of their current privileges).
Opponents of these views have been no more successful in eradicating these ethical
considerations from existing corporate law than they have been in eliminating Chapter 11.
"Contractarian" is the name sometimes given to the scholars who disagree with the idea
that corporations have fiduciary responsibilities. See Hazen, supra note 57, at 285.
Contractarians generally view the corporation as a nexus of contracts, leaving the various
constituents of the corporation free to negotiate the terms of their own contract in order to
protect their interests. See id. Contractarians believe the best way to achieve efficiency is to
allow the parties to bargain unfettered by government imposition of restraints. See id. If
restraints are imposed, so the theory goes, resources are unable to move into the hands of
those most willing to pay for them, and efficiency breaks down as a result. See id.
In this vein, Contractarians view the managers of corporations as sellers of fiduciary
protections and the corporate stockholders as the particular buyers of those protections.
Contractarians believe each constituent of the corporation is free to bargain for the protection
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Assuming that these corporate fiduciary responsibilities do exist, they do
not disappear when a corporate bankruptcy is filed.62 Recognizing corporate
fiduciary responsibilities is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's rehabilitative
policies, including the Code's goals of saving jobs and community resources. 63
In fact, Chapter 11 is based on the entity theory of the corporation, 64 further
they desire as long as there are no restraints imposed. See id. at 206; Rutherford B. Cambell,
Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
561, 565 (1996).
62 See Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary
Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23
SFroN HALL L. Rnv. 1467, 1467-68 (1988); The Chapter 11 Players in Contemporary
Bankritcy Practice: Roles, Obligations, and Ethical Considerations of Debtors in
Possession, Trustees, Examiners, and Committees, 668 PLI/Comm 371, 380 (1993). In a
typical corporate bankruptcy, the corporation's fiduciary obligations broaden to include not
just shareholders and suppliers but also creditors. See Donovan S. Schuenke v. Sampsell, 226
F.2d 804, 812 (9th Cir. 1955); Mediators, Inc. v. Manney Inc., 1996 WL 554576 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 1996); see generally Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in
Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323 (1992) (discussing a Chapter 11 debtor's
fiduciary responsibilities); John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in
Possession, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 133 (discussing the debtor in possession's fiduciary
obligations to creditors and shareholders). For a general discussion of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy debtor's fiduciary obligations, see C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has
the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditor's Lawyer in Banknptcy Reorganization
Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 52-57, 59-60 (1997).
Nothing suggests that obligations to employees or to the community at large cease simply
because a corporation becomes insolvent. A contrary conclusion can be inferred from the
priority system found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 and 507, which places employee benefit plans in a
priority position for the purpose of bankruptcy distribution. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507
(1994).
63 The purpose of a reorganization proceeding is to keep the debtor in business.
According to Congress, it is "better for a business to be rehabilitated than to be liquidated so
that the suppliers of the debtor and its employees will not lose their sources of
revenue .... [Tihe employees will retain their jobs and continue to be paid for services."
Banbkrptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the
Judicial Machinery of the Committee of the Judiciary on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.
726 (1977) (statement of Sylvan M. Cohen, President of Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment
Trust). In discussing the purpose of providing priority treatment for wages and benefits,
Congress stated that the "purpose of this priority, as with the administrative expense priority,
is in part to ensure that employees will not abandon a failing business for fear of not being
paid. In that sense, it contributes to financial rehabilitation." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 187
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6147-48.
64 See In re Hickory Mills Apartments of Columbus, Ltd., 133 B.R. 898, 901 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1991) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code has adopted the entity theory of the
corporation).
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establishing that corporations in Chapter 11 have fiduciary responsibilities to
parties other than creditors and shareholders. 65 Because there is nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code that eradicates a corporation's obligation to act in a manner
consistent with general societal interests, and because the Bankruptcy Code
itself imposes fiduciary responsibilities on corporate debtors,66 a broader
variety of interests should be considered by debtors when making pivotal issues
in a Chapter 11 case. Most current case law regarding standing, however, fails
65 See Rapoport, supra note 2, at 807-17. Professor Rapoport suggests that a debtor in
possession may owe fiduciary responsibilities to persons who are neither creditors nor
shareholders of the debtor. See id. She argues that the debtor's counsel is in a unique position
to help the debtor discharge its obligations to such interests, by advising the debtor of these
fiduciary obligations. See id. at 787-98. According to Rapoport, the debtor's counsel is "a
counselor, obligated to explore and explain the ramifications of possible strategies to the
client. Moreover, she has the duty to the legal system as an officer of the court that she cannot
forget." Id. at 789. Professor Rapoport also suggests that any attorney can stress
psychological and moral considerations when counseling a debtor in possession, see id. at
821, suggesting at least the possibility that these factors could take precedence over profit
maximization.
66 Admittedly, these obligations are tempered by obligations to creditors first and
shareholders second, but these obligations remain nonetheless. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
provides that equity holders, which are lower in priority than creditors, may not receive any
money under a Chapter 11 plan unless creditors agree or are paid in full. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). Even shareholders who will receive no distribution under the plan
continue to have bankruptcy court standing, however, indicating that standing is not dependent
upon receiving a distribution from the estate. See Official Comm. of Equity See. Holders v.
Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankntcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 680-83 (1993) (noting that shareholders are parties in
interest); Bowles & Rapoport, supra note 62, at 89-90 (noting that debtors may owe fiduciary
duties to both creditors and shareholders even if the debtor is insolvent). As one author has
noted, while it is true that the debtor in possession is required to maximize returns to
creditors, this is not to be done at the expense of shareholders, whose rights are more junior
to creditors. See Brenda Hacker Osborne, Note, Attorneys' Fees in Chapter 11
Reorganization: A Case for Modified Procedures, 69 IND. L.J. 581, 588 n.47 (1994) (stating
that the debtor in possession need not "select a mode of maximization that harms equity in
order to satisfy creditors faster, when another alternative exists which serves creditors' as well
as equity's interests"). Professors LoPucki and Whitford claim that debtors-in-possession
continue to have fiduciary obligations to shareholders even after insolvency. See LoPucki &
Whitford, supra, at 745-46. They also argue that the competing obligations to creditors and
shareholders do not pose an intrinsic problem becanse managers of debtors in possession do
not-as one would suspect-always align themselves with the interests of shareholders. See
id. Similarly, whether nonpecuniary interests are to be compensated or not, they may be
entitled to standing ina Chapter 11 case.
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to recognize these responsibilities to noncreditor interests, and instead holds that
bankruptcy courts standing is limited primarily to debtor and creditor interests.
C. Defining Bankruptcy Court Standing: The Judge's Role
Under most case law, one needs a present economic or "pecuniary"
interest to assert in order to be heard in a bankruptcy proceeding. This rule
precludes or limits participation in Chapter 11 cases by two groups of persons:
(1) those who have a pecuniary interest to assert, but who also want to assert a
nonpecuniary interest, 67 and (2) those who have no pecuniary interest to assert
and are thus unable to participate in the proceeding at all.68
Although the Bankruptcy Code has been interpreted to preclude
nonpecuniary rights from being heard, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires
this result.69 In fact, the Bankruptcy Code's language permits a much broader
interpretation of standing, thus permitting a variety of rights to be adjudicated
by bankruptcy courts. 70
1. Limitations Based on Pecuniary Rights
Bankruptcy court is a primarily economic forum, primarily addressing
issues surrounding the accumulation, repayment, and discharge of
67 For an example of this type of interest, being asserted by an existing creditor, see
infra notes 147-48 and 152-61 and accompanying text.
68 For examples of these types of interests, see infra notes 149-50 and 162-82 and
accompanying text.
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994). Section 1109 does provide standing to all "parties-in-
interest," but courts have defined this phrase to mean only parties with a current pecuniary
interest in the debtor. See In re Alpex Computer Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 356 (10th Cir. 1995);
Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee (In re Hutchinson), 5 F.3d 750, 756 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[P]arty in interest... is 'generally understood to include all persons whose pecuniary
interests are directly affected by bankruptcy proceedings.'") (quoting White County Bank v.
Leavell (In re Leavell), 141 B.R. 393, 394 (Bankr. S.D. l. 1992)).
70 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. While one might question whether
allowing these rights to be asserted in this context would actually be desirable, doing so may
be necessary in order to ensure that the bankruptcy system, as it is applied to pivotal issues in
large Chapter 11 cases, continues to serve society's greater needs. Huge Chapter 11 cases
have an enormous impact on society as a whole, both in terms of results stemming from the
case-such as job loss, payment of indebtedness, and so on-and legal and court-costs, some
of which are paid by creditors and others of which are paid by taxpayers and even society as a
whole. See GROSS, supra note 2, at 83-86; Warren, supra note 27, at 796.
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indebtedness. 71 I emphasize the word "primarily" because what occurs in
bankruptcy cases, particularly in large Chapter 11 cases, is far more complex
than in even the most sophisticated litigation in other fora. Because there is no
complaint initiating a bankruptcy and, at least initially, no plaintiffs or
defendants, one never knows what relief actually will be requested in a case.72
There are endless numbers of potential "parties in interest," all asserting
different types of rights at different stages of the proceeding. 73 Given this
complexity, the variety of litigated issues, and the primary reason for the trip to
bankruptcy court in the first place,74 most courts have found bankruptcy
71 As bankruptcy courts frequently state, "[ojnce the assets have been identified... it is
the role of the bankruptcy court to determine... the distribution of those assets and the
determination of the parties' rights to them in accordance with the priorities set out by the
Bankruptcy Code." In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 432 (S.D.N.Y 1993); see
also In re Allied Computer Repair, Inc., 202 B.R. 877, 880-81 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996)
("The Bankruptcy Court plays a significant role in protecting the assets of the bankruptcy
estate in order that they be maximized for the benefit of the creditors thereof."); In re
Operation Open City, Inc., 170 B.R. 818, 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("the central role of a
bankruptcy court [is] distributing the assets of the bankruptcy estate").
72 The complaint initiating a civil lawsuit outside bankruptcy tells the parties to the case
what the case is all about. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a). It notifies those parties what interests are
at stake, what damages are being requested, and precisely whose interests are affected. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 8. Bankruptcy cases are initiated by petition, see U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (1994),
and what occurs from that point on varies greatly from case to case, even within the context
of Chapter 11 alone. Moreover, unlike regular litigation in which essentially everyone
affected is a plaintiff or defendant, in bankruptcy, many noanparties are affected. See
Rapoport, supra note 2, at 787-89.
73 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of
Potential Conflicts of Interest in Bankrruptcy, 26 U. CoNN. L. REv. 913, 914-15 (1994)
(noting the frequency with which parties change their allegiance and at times their position, in
a typical Chapter 11 case). Many matters heard by a bankruptcy court are heard by motion.
See Fm). R. B.mm. P. 9013. Persons whose financial interests are affected are given notice
of the motion and other persons may receive notice as well. See id. There are hundreds of
different types of motions, and if any one is contested, it is considered a contested matter, as
that phrase is defined in Rule 9014. See FED. R. BAMMR. P. 9014. Some matters brought
before a bankruptcy court must be initiated by complaint. See FED. R. BAN,,'c. P. 7000-7087.
These are called adversary proceedings and involve a litigation procedure very similar to that
found in federal district court, with a greatly truncated timetable. See id. In addition, there are
complex hearings to consider confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, to approve asset sales, and to
settle claims and litigation to which the debtor is a party. See id.
74 It is assumed here, and is typically the case, that debtors typically file a Chapter 11
petition as a result of excessive indebtedness that they are unable to pay. This is not always
the case. In In re Texaco, 84 B.R. 893 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), Texaco filed a Chapter 11
petition in order to forestall payment of a judgment obtained against it by Pennzoil. See id. at
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standing to be limited in two ways.75 First, the vast majority of courts have held
that one must have a pecuniary or economic stake in the proceeding in order to
be heard.76 Second, many courts have held that a party can have standing on
one issue in a case but not another, depending on the nature of the rights
asserted and the impact that a particular issue has on those rights.77
894. There was no indication that Texaco could not pay the judgment or that its financial
condition was not otherwise perfectly healthy. See id.; see also KEviN J. DELANEY,
STRATFGic BANKRauTCY: How CoRPORAToNs AND CREDrroRs UsE CHAFR 11 To THI
ADVANTAGE 126-59 (1992) (describing his perceived abuse in Texaco's use of the
bankruptcy system to avoid Pennzoil's judgement).
7 5 There are many variations of these two themes, but for the most part, courts
adjudicating standing issues base their reasoning on one or both of these reasons.
7 6 See In re Alpex Computer Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 356 (10th Cir. 1995). Although 11
U.S.C. § 1109(b) broadly defines a "party in interest," the phrase "is generally understood to
include all persons whose pecuniary interests are directly affected by the bankruptcy
proceedings." Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee (In re Hutchinson), 5 F.3d 750,
756 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting White County Bank v. Leavell (In re Leavell), 141 B.R. 393,
394 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1992)).
In determining whether a party has standing to be heard, some courts have held that
party-in-interest standing may depend upon whether there is an interest in the distribution
from the estate. See In re North American Oil & Gas, Inc., 130 B.R. 473, 479 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990) (party in interest "has been held to refer to anyone who has practical stake in the
outcome of the case"); see also In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987)
(former trustee had no standing to object to court allowing government to prosecute suit
against him on behalf of the estate); In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983) (wife
of debtor had no standing to object to appointment of trustee's special counsel in fraudulent
conveyance action against her); Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1979)
("since the bankrupt is normally insolvent [and thus] considered to have no [pecuniary]
interest," he lacks standing to appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court); In re Karpe, 84
B.R. 926 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988) (party-in-interest status denied to bidder for estate property
who had no interest in the res that would be created); In re Malone Properties, No. 8607364
SGR (Bankr. S.D. Miss. June 17, 1992), aff'd, No. S9-0375(R) (S.D. Miss. Nov. 4, 1992)
(insurance carrier had no standing to appear before bankruptcy court on hearing termination
of automatic stay).
77 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 641-43 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that party must have a pecuniary interest in the order that is being appealed in order to have
right to appeal the order; thus creditor who did not possess an asbestos-related personal injury
claim could not appeal plan confirmation order based on treatment of that class of claims
under plan); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Michaels (In re Main Motor Oil), 689
F.2d 445, 453 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating "that the exact contours of the general phrase 'party in
interest' will be clarified by rules [of bankruptcy procedure] and court decisions," and that
courts have the discretion to deny party-in-interest status in a particular instance); EFL, Ltd.
v. Miramar Resources, Inc. (In re Tascosa Petroleum Corp.), 196 B.R. 856, 863 (D. Kan.
1996) (holding that prudential concerns with respect to standing preclude a creditor from
[Vol. 59:429
NONECONOMIC INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Why have so many bankruptcy judges taken a narrow view with respect to
standing? There are several possible explanations. First, as previously stated,
bankruptcy is primarily an economic forum, 78 and most bankruptcy judges are
trained to recognize and address economic rather than noneconomic issues.
Second, most judges in all fora operate under a world view that most easily
recognizes economic interests over other interests.79 As Professor Denis Brion
notes in Rhetoric and the Law of Enterprise,80 the capitalist ethic8' world view
has historically favored entrepreneurial forces over passive interests in land and
other interests. 82 Using the exploitation of Appalachian resources as one
example,8 3 Brion theorizes that this tendency to favor entrepreneurialism favors
the most intensive use for each asset, regardless of the consequences for
individual members of society.84 This approach also favors the elite, who by
necessity share a social class with judges themselves.85 Brion claims that this
tendency explains how the law in this country, which nominally favors
individual rights and humanitarian goals, 86 can pay such minimal attention to
challenging portions of a plan that do not affect its direct interest); In re Westwood Plaza
Apartments, 147 B.R. 692, 698 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) ("[C]reditors lack standing to
challenge provisions of a plan that do not affect them."); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[A] party who is not directly
'aggrieved' by the construction of a provision of the Plan would lack requisite standing.")
(quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 623-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)); In re
B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 124 B.R. 642, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("[C]reditors lack
standing to challenge those portions of a reorganization plan that do not affect their direct
interest."); In re Orlando Investors, L.P., 103 B.R. 593, 597 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)
(declaring that a "statutory right to be heard on an issue" does not include "the right to assert
interests possessed solely by others").
78 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
79 By "economic" I mean the interests of production and product, as compared to land
rights or other more passive forms of property.
80 42 SYRACUSEL. REv. 117 (1991).
81 Brion defines this phrase as the American culture world view that finds no
inconsistency or difficulty in favoring enterprise and its products over land entitlement. Brion
claims that this world view is ubiquitous, permeating not only legal discourse, but all other
loci of public discourse as well. Brion claims that this world view is so incredibly strong that
it prevails despite the fact that it is strongly at odds with deep political views that such
favoritism should not exist. See id. at 118.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 119-25.
84 See id. at 126-32, 138-42.
85 See id. at 150.
86 See id. at 148-49.
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these issues. 87 Finally, Brion alludes that those who litigate most are most
favored in the process through a combination of these factors and a familiarity
with the system.8 8 Although Brion did not apply his theories to bankruptcy
courts, they may be equally useful in explaining how bankruptcy courts make
decisions. Bankruptcy judges are more likely to recognize familiar commonly-
litigated, economic interests, rather than the more unusual and less tangible
noneconomic ones.
Finally, recognizing a narrow range of issues may simply make life easier
for the judiciary. Courts can think and speak in the most common language of
the forum: that of money, the raison d'etre of each Chapter 11 debtor's trip to
court. This is not the sole reason other parties appear in that forum, however,
and their nonpecuniary interests should not be ignored by the judiciary, which
has full authority to consider these interests. 8 9
Although courts have held that one must have a current economic right to
be heard and that whether one has standing can vary from issue to issue, these
holdings are not the product of careful statutory interpretation. The idea that
standing varies from situation to situation seems to make a great deal of sense,
but is at odds with the language of the standing statute.90 The other common
notion, that standing is limited to persons with pecuniary rights, is entirely
inconsistent with existing statutory law. 91
87 See id.
88 See id. at 152 (arguing that those with power tend to "dominate discourse").
89 Many judges already take these kinds of interests into account when they make
decisions. See, e.g., In re Financial News Network, Inc., 980 F.2d 165, 169-70 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that bankruptcy courts have broad flexibility in determining which bidder is the
successful one in a § 363(b) sale); In re After Six, Inc., 154 B.R. 876, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993) (declaring that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code, like any law, must be read in its content as a
tool of mankind, not a body of edicts to which mankind is a slave"). My own experience in
practice, however, as well as my discussions with others, lead me to believe that judges
would rather consider these interests without doing so explicitly in reported decisions. Part of
the purpose of this Article is to make explicit what is currently occurring implicitly.
90 See In re Tascosa Petroleum Corp., 196 B.R. 856, 862-63 (D. Kan. 1996)
(discussing whether Article III prudential concerns apply in bankruptcy or in fact, whether
that standard for bankruptcy standing is more lenient than the Article I requirements).
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994). Often the requirement that a party possess a pecuniary
interest in or against the debtor is implicit in court discussions regarding standing. For
example, in In re Zaleha, 162 B.R. 309 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), the court noted a tendency
of courts to disallow standing to creditors who purchased claims, but failed to comply strictly
with the transfer requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 3001, implying that one must be a creditor
to have standing. See id. at 313 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001). Other courts have stated
point blank that without creditor status, a party lacks standing to object to a sale or settlement
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Standing in Chapter 11 cases is conferred by section 1109(b)9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which provides that
(b) A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditor's
committee, an equity security holder's committee, a creditor, an equity security
holder, or any indenture trustee may raise and may appear and be heard on any
issue in a case under [Chapter 11].93
The statute purports to identify both who may be heard and the issues on which
they may be heard.94 The statute permits anyone who is a "party in interest" to
be heard on any issue in a case, 95 but does not define "party in interest." 96
agreement. See In re Bicoastal Corp., 164 B.R. 1009, 1015 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (noting
that any beneficiary of a plan, no matter how remote such beneficiary status is, has a right to
object and be heard on confirmation of a debtor's plan and that those who are not
beneficiaries lack this status). This court also concluded, consistent with this approach, that a
creditor whose claim is eliminated through setoff of a claim by the debtor back against it can
be ignored and denied the right to be heard on any issue in a case. See id.
Other courts have articulated the same idea in a variety of ways. For example, under
some analyses, claimants must file proof of claims (and thus hold claims) in order to
"participate in a reorganization." In re B. Cohen & Sons v. Caterers, Inc., 124 B.R. 642, 644
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing In re Charter Co., 876 F.2d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Other courts side-step the issue, declaring that only parties in interest may object to a
plan under § 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code, and that a creditor is a party in interest. See In re
Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1551 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing 8 COLTRONBANKR.
3020.04 (15th ed. 1989)). This approach defies deductive logic. Even assuming that all fire
trucks were red, it would not follow that these are the only red things. While it is true that
creditors are parties in interest, the term is by no means limited to creditors. See In re UNR
Indus. Inc., 71 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. N.D. M1. 1987) (finding that the word "including"
contained in § 1109 indicates that the list of parties in the statute is not exclusive).
92 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1994).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 See id.
95 See id. Obviously, the statute does not mean any issue at all; the issue must be related
to the case.
96 See In re River Bend-Oxford Assoc., 114 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). As the
court explained:
The phrase "party in interest" can be found in 46 separate sections of the
Bankruptcy Code, [yet is undefined in Section 101]. Th[e] lack of... definition
was intentional. Congress'[s] failure to define party in interest specifically was
discussed by both Senator DeConcini and Representative Edwards during the
proceedings preceding the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code .... Senator
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Section 1109 provides a list of parties who qualify as parties in interest, but the
list does not purport to be exclusive. In other words, the concept of "party in
interest" is defined by example. If one needed to be a creditor (or an equity
holder) to have standing, the word "including" would be superfluous in the
statute, which would violate a primary canon of statutory interpretation. 97 Thus,
on its face, section 1109 permits parties other than debtors, creditors, and
equity holders to assert rights in a bankruptcy case.98
2. Contextual Applications of Section 1109
Consistent with this reading of the statute, a few bankruptcy courts have
concluded that there is no requirement that the asserted right be pecuniary in
order to be heard. Rather, one must have a "sufficient stake" in the
proceeding, 99 a "vital interest at stake,"1 00 an "interest in" the case, 101 or
DeConcini stated: "Rules of bankruptcy procedure or court decisions will determine
who is a party in interest for the particular purposes of the provision in question."
Id. at 113 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. S17,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)). "Party in interest" is
an expandable concept, depending upon the particular factual context in which it is applied.
See id.
97 
"It is a canon of statutory interpretation not to treat any words as superfluous but to
give all the language some meaning...." Fluet v. McCabe, 12 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Mass.
1938); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. N.D. l. 1987)
(concluding that the word "including" in § 1109 is expansive, not limiting).
98 Arguably, the word "including" does not mean this at all, but merely means that the
concept of a party in interest includes the following parties and no one else. This is not the
interpretation given by most courts that have analyzed the meaning of this statute, however.
See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71
B.R. at 471 n.9. Moreover, if the statute was designed to be exclusive, it should say so
explicitly.
99 See ln re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 471.
100 See In re Wolf Creek Valley Metropolitan Dist. No. IV, 138 B.R. 610, 615 (D.
Colo. 1992) (holding that the critical test regarding bankruptcy court standing is whether the
prospective party has a sufficient stake in the proceeding to require representation).
101 See In re James Wilson Assoc., 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 1992). As the court
explained:
We think all the section means is that anyone who has a legally protected interest
that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding is entitled to assert that interest with
respect to any issue to which it pertains, thus making explicit what is implicit in an in
rein proceeding that everyone with a claim to the res has a right to be heard before the
res is disposed of since that disposition will extinguish all such claims.
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simply a right to "fair representation" in the Chapter 11 case before asserting
nonpecuniary rights.102
a. The Asbestos Cases
Some economic rights arise in the future, and consequently do not qualify
as pecuniary rights. An example is future asbestos claimants-people who have
been exposed to asbestos, who may contract asbestosis, cancer, or another
serious injury as a result of such exposure, but who have no current symptoms,
and no cause of action against the asbestos manufacturer. Many of these people
are not even identifiable at the time the debtor is reorganizing. 103
Without some linguistic jostling, these persons do not possess a current
economic right that can be asserted in an asbestos manufacturer's bankruptcy
case; this is true because a claim for asbestosis generally does not arise until the
injury becomes manifest.104 Section 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a
creditor as an entity with a "claim" that arose at or before the order for
bankruptcy relief was entered.105 Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which defines a claim, requires that the holder of a claim possess a right to
Id. at 169; see also In re Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116 B.R. 208, 213 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1990); see also 5 CoLuAR ON BANKRupTcY 1009.02, at 1109-27 (15th ed. 1996) (stating
that "party in interest" is to be interpreted broadly to allow those parties affected by the
Chapter 11 case to be heard).
102 See In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. 546, 550 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988); In re Johns-Manville, Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
103 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041; In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R.
552, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re TNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 471; In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476, 477 (Banukr. N.D. ]Ml. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
104 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1035; In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 628;
see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in Banknzqtcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go
Far Enough, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 515, 515 (1995) (stating that the Code must be amended to
provide that future asbestos claims qualify as "'claims' that 'arise' at the time that the debtor
commits the act on which liability is based"); Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related
Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Banknqtcy Code and Their
Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 75-76 (1986).
105 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (1994); see also In re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 124
B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (defining creditor as an entity with a claim that arose
at or before the order for relief was entered).
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payment or a present right to an equitable remedy from the debtor. 106 No such
current right exists in persons who have not yet manifested any illness.
This situation has posed a dilemma for courts and debtors. 107 Under the
Chapter 11 scheme in place when these cases were decided,10 8 only "claims"
could be handled in a Chapter 11 plan 109 and only "claims" could be
discharged. 110 Moreover, only "parties in interest" could participate in these
cases at all.111 Although courts sought to be fair to these persons, 112 who would
10 6 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994); see also In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), aft'd, 168 B.R. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that a class of future
claimants did not hold "claims" against the debtor when there was no discemable connection
between the debtor and the alleged class of claimants).
107 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1035; In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. at
554; In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 470; In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 624.
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994). In 1994, the so-called Manville Amendments were
added to the Code. These amendments specifically provide party-in-interest status to asbestos
claimants and otherwise address the treatment of asbestos claims in Chapter 11 plans. See id.
109 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) appointed to consider new
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, has proposed additional legislation addressing mass tort
cases, such as asbestos cases. Because the 1994 Manville Amendments did not apply to or
address other types of mass tort cases, the NBRC has proposed various amendments to
broaden the original amendments. Among the proposed amendments is an amendment to the
definition of the "claim" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). See NATIONAL BANKRupTcY REVIEW
CoMMISSIoN, BAKRau=rcY: THE NExr TWENTY YEARs 9 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter
NBRC Report].
110 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1994). Discharge, which relieves the reorganized corporate
debtor from having to pay the obligation, outside the plan obligations, is the debtor's primary
benefit to confirming a plan. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (1994) (discussing the special
tax rules applicable to the discharge of indebtedness in Chapter 11 reorganizations). If that
part of a claim that is unpaid is not discharged, then this very important bankruptcy feature is
lost, and the case itself has lost much of its benefit for the debtor. See In re Johns-Manville,
Corp., 36 B.R. at 749.
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1994).
112 For example, the Manville court noted:
Any plan not dealing with [the interests of potential asbestos claimants] precludes a
meaningful and effective reorganization and thus inures to the detriment of the
reorganization .... If they are denied standing as parties in interest, they will be denied
all opportunity either to help design the ship that sails away from these reorganization
proceedings with their cargo on board or to assert their interests during a pre-launching
distribution.
[Vol. 59:429
NONECONOMIC INTERESTS 1N BANKR UPTCY
certainly be affected if the debtor ceased to exist and thus became judgment-
proof before future claims could be paid, debtors had other motives for
recognizing future claims. Unless these future claims could be addressed in a
Chapter 11 plan and ultimately discharged to the extent not paid, the company
would continue to be laden with future asbestos suits and could never emerge
free of this debt. 113
Recognizing that these parties had no "claims" and apparently reading
section 1109114 rather narrowly, some courts have relied on the broad equitable
powers of section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code115 to grant party-in-interest
status to these claimants, to provide representation to them in cases through a
legal representative, and ultimately to permit the treatment of these future
claims in plans of reorganization. 116 Other courts held that section 1109 alone
was already broad enough to grant party-in-interest status to future tort
claimants.117 As the court stated in In re UNR Indus., Inc.:
The gist of section 1109 is clear. The right to participate in Chapter 11 cases is
not limited to creditors and owners. Persons who are not creditors but
In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 749; see also In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041 (stating
that it is in the interest of future tort victims to recover from the plan, as there may be no
other source of recovery).
113 As the Court in In re Amatex Corp. stated:
Amatex, the debtor, filed the petition to appoint a guardian ad litem. Its major
concern is to receive a discharge in the reorganization proceeding from all possible
claims-including those of future asbestos victims.... It is in the interest of Amatex
that future claimants be deemed creditors in order that their claims might be discharged
by the plan.
In re Amatex Corp, 755 F.2d at 1043. The debtor in In re UNR Industries had a similar
motive. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 470 ("The debtor wants to resolve the
question of whether the putative claimants and/or future claimants are in fact 'creditors'....
It would prefer that both groups be determined to be "creditors" so that they can... have
these potential claims discharged by its plan.").
114 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994).
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
116 See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. M11. 1986).
117 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042; In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 471;
In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 623.
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nevertheless have demonstrated a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case
may be deemed to be parties in interest and be entitled to be heard 118
In In re Amatex Corp., the court similarly held that individuals who were
exposed to asbestos but did not manifest any symptoms had a practical stake in
the reorganization, entitling them to party-in-interest standing and a voice in the
reorganization proceeding. 119 Thus, some courts have granted bankruptcy court
standing to persons who did not hold traditional bankruptcy court claims.
b. Conferring Standing on Groups Representing the Public Interest
Although courts have been consistent in conferring bankruptcy court
standing on future asbestos claimants, there has been less consistency in
allowing states and consumer groups to assert rights in bankruptcy cases on
behalf of the public. The voices of these groups have been heard by some
courts and silenced by others.
As for the rights of states and municipalities, the State of Iowa was
recognized as a party in interest that could be heard on any issue in a Chapter
11 bankruptcy case. 120 The court relied on the official comment to section
1109, which stated that this section "continues the broad concept of the absolute
right to be heard in order to ensure fair representation in the case." 12 1 The State
118 See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. at 471 (quoting In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d
at 1042).
119 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042.
120 See In re Citizens Loan & Thrift Co., 7 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1980).
121 See id. Several courts have held that states, governmental entities, and municipalities
are entitled to standing under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). See id.; In re Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire, 88 B.R. 546, 555 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); see also SEC v. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940) (finding that the Securities and Exchange
Commission had standing under the Bankruptcy Act). In holding that the state auditor was
allowed to intervene as a party in interest in the debtor's bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Court of
Iowa stated that, "[a]s the entity charged with the duty of supervision of industrial loan
companies by Chapter 536A of the Iowa Code, the State Auditor is a 'party affected' by the
proceedings." In re Citizens Loan & Thrift Co., 7 B.R. at 90. Likewise, the State of New
Hampshire was allowed to intervene in a debtor's bankruptcy because it had a statutory basis
for being involved, namely ensuring the regulatory compliance of the debtor in
reorganization. See In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. at 555. The SEC
was also allowed to intervene in a Chapter 11 case because "[t]he Commission has a
sufficient interest in the maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance of its
public duties to entitle it through intervention to prevent reorganizations, which should rightly
be subjected to its scrutiny, from proceeding without it." SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. at 460; In re Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 566,
[Vol. 59:429
NONECONOMIC NIERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
of New Hampshire similarly was recognized as a party in interest in the largest
public utility bankruptcy in the country, in which the debtor provided electricity
to most of the state. 122 Despite the fact that these official bodies did not have
creditor status, they were allowed to be heard in these cases on issues affecting
the general public.' 2 3
Nongovernmental public interest groups have not fared as well. In In re
Public Service & Improvement Co. of New Hampshire, a consumer advocate
and industry association requested full party-in-interest status from the court.' 24
Such status was denied to both entities, in part because the State already was
representing the interests of the public.' 25
In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., the first Eastern Airlines reorganization
proceeding, a consumer group that, among other things, published Consumer
Reports, sought to force the airline to honor a prepetition agreement regarding
the exchange of airline tickets. 126 In order to accomplish this, the consumer
group, Consumers Union, needed standing, which the court refused to grant.' 27
The court conceded that section 1109's language was broad, but concluded
nevertheless that one must be a creditor, or have a right to equitable relief, in
order to have standing.' 28 Because the group itself had no such rights, and had
not identified a particular group whose rights it had permission to assert, the
court refused to grant Consumers Union standing. ' 29
573 (9th Cir. 1982). The Bankruptcy Court was not required to give these entities standing,
and under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, arguably could have ignored their
interests altogether. These bankruptcy courts' willingness to grant standing in these instances
demonstrates a willingness to factor noneconomic interests into the bankruptcy system.
122 See In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. at 550-57.
123 See id.; In re Citizens Loan & Thrift Co., 7 B.R. at 90.
124 See In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. at 549-57.
125 See id. at 555.
126 See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Eastern, in its reorganization plan, sought to exchange prepetition airline tickets for
postpetition travel. Consumers Union (CU) argued that this inadequately compensated
customers, and advocated for a complete refund of the prepetition ticket prices. See id.
127 See id. at 848-51.
128 See id. at 849.
129 See id. at 848. In fact, CU did obtain powers of attorney from eight individuals who
gave CU the right to represent their interests in the case. The court opinion states that CU had
not become involved until after a law firm contacted it and offered to represent its consumer
constituents in this case, completely free of charge. See id. CU then solicited powers of
attorney from 40,000 people, ultimately obtaining only eight, one of which was from a CU
employee. See id.
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Neither of these consumer advocate cases preclude the possibility of
recognizing standing for such groups in the future. In the Public Service Co. of
New Hampshire case, the additional representation of the consumer group was
seen as redundant and thus unnecessary. The Eastern Airlines case also
presented unique circumstances. If Consumers Union had been hired by a
legitimate group of consumers, the group may well have been permitted
participation. In situations in which a substantial interest is unrecognized and
unrepresented in a case, granting standing to a consumer group could be
extremely important.
3. Additional Support for a Broader Standing Standard
There are several reasons to take a broader approach to standing. First, as
discussed above, the statute clearly permits courts to grant standing more freely
and may even require it.130 Second, other federal courts do not limit standing to
those with pecuniary interest. 131 To have standing in other courts, one must
have only a direct and substantial interest; 132 the injury need not be financial or
the resulting obligation immediately due and payable. Nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code itself modifies this standard. Although discussing a slightly
130 See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
131 Although bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts, they enforce constitutional
limitations on standing. See EFL Ltd. v. Miramar Resources, Inc. (In re Tascosa Petroleum
Corp.), 196 B.R. 856, 863 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996). Article I in no way limits standing to
persons with pecuniary rights and in fact provides standing to anyone with a "substantial"
stake in the proceeding or an "injury in fact." Id. These persons are defined as "persons
aggrieved." Id.
132 See id. It is possible that this standard is actually more stringent than that imposed in
bankruptcy court. As the court in Miramar Resources stated:
11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) expands the right to be heard in a Chapter 11 proceeding to a wider
class than those who qualify under the "person aggrieved" standard. The "person
aggrieved" standard applies to those wanting to appeal a bankruptcy order, and is more
exacting than the constitutional "injury in fact" requirement of standing. In re Alpex
Computer Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 357 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995). It is unclear to this court what
injury requirement for standing the Circuit intended for bankruptcy proceedings.
However, this case is decided on the general prudential principal that one does not have
standing to assert another's rights, regardless of the severity of injury required. See
Kane, 843 F.2d at 642 (standing involves two-step inquiry; first, whether litigant has
been sufficiently injured, and second, whether litigant is proper proponent of the rights
he seeks to assert).
Id. at 863 n.6.
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different issue, Professor Karen Gross recently proposed that the right to
participate in a bankruptcy proceeding should be granted to anyone with a
"nexus with the debtor for whom there is substantial injury caused by the
bankruptcy filing and... an injury redressable through the reorganization
process."'133 Regardless of the precise standard adopted, standing in bankruptcy
need not rest on the existence of a financial interest.
These ideas are far from radical. The Bankruptcy Code scheme already
recognizes numerous noneconomic interests. The Bankruptcy Code priority
system and many other Code provisions demonstrate that dollars are not the
sole issue in a Chapter 11 case. For example, the debtor must take the highest
and "best" offer for its assets in a sale under section 363,134 not merely the
highest dollar value for such assets.135 The debtor must propose a plan that is in
the creditors' "best interest," not their best economic interest. 136 The debtor
133 GRoss, supra note 2, at 228-29. This quoted material is Professor Gross's definition
of a community. There are several distinctions between Professor Gross's proposal regarding
bankruptcy participation and my own, although I believe they are primarily linguistic. In her
thought-provoking book, Professor Gross discusses the need to consider community interests
in bankruptcy. She defines a "community" as an interest that is substantial and is redressable
through the reorganization case. See id. Standing itself is not discussed at any length, although
for certain people-namely those who fit within the definition of a "community"-the result
is the same: many persons who previously lacked standing would have it. The only two real
differences I see between Professor Gross's approach and my own are: (1) I do not limit my
proposal to "community" or "public" interests, but include expanded standing for private
"nonpecuniary" interests as well; and (2) Gross's proposal requires courts to consider
community interests, whereas my own proposal requires only that courts listen to the
substantial interests that appear and request representation in the case. Aside from these
differences, the approaches are very similar. She also proposes a variety of statutory
amendments. Although I argue here that amendment is not necessary due to the broad
language contained in Section 1109, I am beginning to change my view. If nothing else,
amendment would surely clarify things for the judiciary and make explicit what many courts
already do.
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
135 See id.; In re Financial News Network, 126 B.R. 152, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(remanding to the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether the available bids were the
highest and best offer for the debtor's estate). Similarly, in In re After Six, Inc., 154 B.R.
876, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), the court stated that a bankruptcy court may accept a lower
bid for a debtor's estate when that lower bidder had other factors such as societal needs in its
favor. See id. The court went on to say that "[tihe Bankruptcy Code, like any law, must be
read in its context as a tool of mankind, not a body of edicts to which mankind is a slave
irrespective of its interests to the contrary." Id.136 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994) (emphasis added) (describing the standards in the
Historical Notes to § 1129). Additionally, the broad automatic stay imposed by § 362 does not
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may not reject a collective bargaining agreement simply because the contract is
not economically efficient. 137
The priority system also recognizes that not every dollar loss is experienced
equally by creditors. The priority system is designed to pay a higher rate to
certain creditors because the loss will hurt them more. 138 It pays others at a
higher rate based on fairness139 or because certain values are considered higher
in priority, on a societal level, than others. 140 All of these priority rules violate
the general rule of equality of treatment141 and demonstrate sensitivity to
noneconomic issues.142 The bankruptcy system in place right now is designed
to achieve multiple goals, some economic and some noneconomic. 1 43 The
apply to government agencies pursuing actions to preserve the public's health and welfare.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994).
137 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). In fact, the debtor must negotiate carefully with the
union to produce a new contract. If this is not successful, in some jurisdictions the debtor
cannot reject the contract unless the contract will make the whole company liquidate. See id.;
see also 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (providing that a reorganized debtor must continue to
provide all employee benefits following confirmation of a plan).
138 Examples of claims that are favored because the claimant would otherwise be
disproportionately harmed include priority for certain wage claims and priority for employee
benefits. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) and (4) (1994).
139 Examples of priorities that are favored out of fairness include priorities for
administrative claims for people who transact business with the debtor postpetition, see 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1994), priority for providing deposits on goods, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(6) (1994), and priority for taxes, which would otherwise be paid by other taxpayers.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994).
140 Examples of priorities based on societal values include those due for alimony,
maintenance or support, or for child support. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1994).
141 See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d
1487, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that one of the primary goals of the bankruptcy laws is to
provide for equality of treatment among creditors). The legislative history of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act states that bankruptcy policy strongly favors equality of treatment of
all creditors. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 112 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5898. The House debate on the Bankruptcy Reform Act also states, in the context of a student
loan exemption, that the fundamental premises of the bankruptcy law are a fresh start for the
debtor and equality of treatment for all debts and creditors. See 124 CONG. REc. 1792-93
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Dodd).
142 For example, Congress's decision to prioritize payments due to a spouse or child for
support, alimony, or maintenance, even above those payments due to a governmental entity
for taxes or penalties, demonstrates a sensitivity for the well-being of single parents and their
children. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1994).
14 3 See Rapoport, supra note 2, at 837 (arguing that when social policies and bankruptcy
policies clash, the debtor's counsel must ensure that the rights of unrepresented interests are
considered by the court); Warren, supra note 27, at 787-88 (noting that persons without
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system also contains considerable flexibility. Thus, recognizing bankruptcy
standing as a broad concept is consistent with the existing bankruptcy system.
If further justification is needed to adopt a broad approach to standing,
consider the alternative. A strictly pecuniary approach is certainly tidy, black
and white, and easy to apply. Like many rules with these attributes, however, it
is arbitrary and incoherent. It grants the right to be heard to those with claims,
regardless of size,144 and leaves those without that type of right with no voice at
all. Attesting to its incoherence, one can simply go out and "buy" standing by
buying someone else's claim. 145 Needless to say, one should not have to
purchase access to the court system.
IRI. CHAPTER 11: A MULTI-PARTY PARADIGM
In any Chapter 11 case, there are many potential parties in interest. As the
prior section suggests, however, the traditional parties to the case are debtors
and creditors. Adding even more parties will obviously create added costs. If
costs are relevant to bankruptcy cases-and I believe they are-the question
becomes whether these added costs are worth it. This question can be answered
only if we can identify interests that currently are unheard and determine that
they deserve to be heard.146 If so, we must identify a purpose for hearing these
claims can be protected to some extent in a bankruptcy proceeding). Professor Warren does
acknowledge, however, that the Code's current provisions provide only one method of
considering noncreditors' interests, namely, keeping the debtor alive. See Elizabeth Warren,
Bankrdptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MlcH. L. RaV. 336, 355-56 (1993). The
proposals in this Article consider additional ways in which to consider these noneconomic
interests.
144 Although it is certainly true that holders of smaller claims may have less to say about
certain issues than holders of larger claims, as long as standing is based on pecuniary
interests, those who have them can speak and those who do not have them cannot.
145 In fact, buying and trading bankruptcy claims has become a cottage industry. See
Chain J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 2 (1990). Although some courts tend to
look down on persons who attempt to gain control of a Chapter 11 debtor by buying a
controlling share of claims in a particular class, see id. at 38-39, no one seems to mind if a
person buys less than a controlling share. One need only transfer the claim unconditionally
and provide proper notice of the transfer. See Fm. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e); see also GROSS,
supra note 2, at 184-85 (arguing that when large numbers of claims are bought by one entity,
other creditors lose power in the case).
146 See generally Rapoport, supra note 2 (arguing throughout her article that there are
numerous unrepresented interests in Chapter 11 cases).
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interests in bankruptcy cases, and then weigh the costs against the benefits of
doing so.
A. Examples of Nonpecuniary Interests and the Contexts in Which They
Arise
We need only continue this inquiry if important interests are not being
heard in bankruptcy cases. Such interests can take many forms, including those
in the examples that follow.
1. San Gobin Continuing Care Center
San Gobin is a nursing home located in a small city and is subsidized by
federal funds. Despite the subsidies, changes in health care reimbursement
procedures have forced it into the red, and thus into Chapter 11. Among the
nursing home's clientele are a large group of elderly persons with long-term,
below-market contracts with the debtor, under which these persons prepaid
(primarily through federal subsidies) for extended life care at San Gobin. San
Gobin provides these residents with two things they cannot obtain elsewhere.
First, as a result of the prepayment and the very favorable contracts, they pay
almost no monthly charge for services at the home. Second, they get around-
the-clock nursing care, which is no longer provided at this level anywhere in
the city or surrounding areas. The debtor's new business plan is to "gussy up"
San Gobin and turn it into an upscale retirement community. The debtor
believes that the mere presence of the subsidized residents will foil the upscale
plan, which looks as though it will be highly profitable. Moreover, the below-
market contracts are an economic disaster for the debtor and are to be rejected
under the debtor's Chapter 11 plan, under the business judgment rule. 147
Although the residents can assert an economic claim for their losses, they
cannot get comparable services anywhere in the area, and cannot get such
services anywhere for the amount of damages they will receive.1 48
147 The "business judgment rule," which is the standard used to determine whether a
debtor may reject an executory contract, merely requires that rejection be financially
beneficial to the debtor's estate and creditors. See In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R.
222, 230 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); In re Beare Co., 177 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1994). It is virtually impossible for the nondebtor party to contest rejection. See In re G
Survivor Corp., 171 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd sub. nom., John Forsyth
Co. v. G Licensing, Ltd., 187 B.R. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
148 The residents' claims will be unsecured claims, and will most likely receive cents on
the dollar. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1994); Medical Malpractice Ins. Assoc. v. Hirsh (In re
[Vol. 59:429
NOAECONOMIC INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
2. Krupa's Bar and Grill
Krupa's has operated as a local neighborhood bar and grill since 1931.
Located in an old ethnic neighborhood in a large city, it has attracted a local
crowd for both food and drink for over sixty years. This past year, Krupa's was
hit with two lawsuits for damages caused by customers who left Krupa's "under
the influence." In recent years, Krupa's failed to change with the times and to
keep closer tabs on drunkenness. It believes that more lawsuits are in the wings.
Krupa's was forced to file a Chapter 11 petition to stay alive and ultimately its
operations were terminated. While still in Chapter 11, the debtor sought buyers
for the business. A local couple bid $20,000 for the assets and was outbid by a
large corporation operating a chain of strip joints. All of this bidder's places of
business are operated under the original names of old local businesses, in order
to improve the places' images and try to maintain some of the old clientele. The
strip joint is willing to pay a hefty price for the assets in order to obtain the
assets free of all existing claims, particularly outstanding tort claims that may
arise out of Krupa's past conduct. There are no zoning issues. Needless to say,
the neighbors believe the strip joint will corrupt the neighborhood. They have
organized to challenge the sale, although none are directly affected by it
economically.
3. Fancy Pants
In the context of a section 363 sale, 149 the debtor receives two competing
bids for its manufacturing business, which produces suits and tuxedos. One
bidder, a competitor, has offered $5 million for the plant and other assets and
intends to permanently close the plant in order to eliminate competition and
enhance its own market share. This is the offer that the debtor has accepted. A
competing bid has been received from another bidder, who operates a similar
facility abroad. This bidder has offered $4,600,000 for the same assets, but
Lavigne), 114 F.3d 379, 389 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that, based on 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), when
a contract is rejected, the resulting contract rejection claim is an unsecured claim).
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994). Section 363(b)(1) states that "[tihe trustee, after
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate." Id. Such property may be sold "free and clear of any interest in such
property" if certain conditions are met, with all claims to attach to the proceeds of sale. 11
U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994). If property is sold free and clear of all claims, then one may not sue
the purchaser of the property for injuies resulting from the products or actions of the
predecessor-seller. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987).
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intends to operate the business at this location, using the existing labor force.
The employees argue that the $4,600,000 bid is the best overall bid because it
will save jobs, but they have no contracts or unpaid claims. Under the majority
view of standing, the employees have no right to be heard on any issue in the
case.150
B. Super-Rehabilitation: How the Code Disregards These Interests
All of these scenarios share certain attributes. All involve pivotal issues in a
Chapter 11 case, in which significant nonpecuniary issues are affected. In all
cases, if the court concerns itself only with the current economic interests of
creditors, then significant harm will be caused to noncreditor third parties.
Because of the special privileges bankruptcy provides, some of these interests
could not be affected in this way outside bankruptcy. Thus, these results should
not be permitted inside bankruptcy either.
Many of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that permit these interests
to be disregarded are the same provisions that facilitate rehabilitation under the
Code, 151 creating tension between promoting reorganization and considering
noneconomic interests.
1. San Gobin, Rejection, and Majority Rule
The way the Bankruptcy Code permits disregard of the San Gobin's
residents' rights is quite radical. Specifically, section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code permits any debtor to disavow or reject any contract, and to substitute its
performance with a general unsecured claim equal to the resulting contract
damages. 152 There is no right to specific performance and very little, if any,
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
151 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1994) (allowing sale of assets free and clear of all
claims); 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994) (permitting rejection of executory contracts); 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (1994) (limiting lawsuits against bankruptcy debtors). We cannot simply eliminate these
provisions, as they are very helpful in facilitating rehabilitation.
152 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994) provides:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject
any executory contract or wmxpired lease of the debtor.
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee--
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ability for the nondebtor party to the contract to challenge the rejection. 153
Thus, under the prevailing standard for rejecting an executory contract under
section 365,154 the business judgment rule, 155 a court can permit the contracts
to be rejected despite the fact that the residents will have no place to go. 156
In addition, under the provisions regarding confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan, 157 other creditors and creditor groups have a right to decide whether to
kick out the residents and approve the upscale plan. The decision is made by
majority or supermajority rule, even though the residents are not only creditors
but are affected by the plan to a far greater degree than the other creditors. In
this approval process, the size of the claim determines the size of the voice that
each creditor has. This makes perfect mathematical sense when the interests
being asserted are pecuniary, that is, economic and presently due and owing.
When the interests are not pecuniary, however, they are not considered at all in
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustees will promptly cure,
such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or
lease.
Id. (emphasis added).
153 If the residents were parties to what was legally a lease, rather than a contract, their
rights would be protected somewhat by § 365(h), which provides that when the debtor is a
landlord, the tenant cannot be removed from the premises unless the landlord continues to pay
for essential services. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1994). This contract is probably not a real
estate lease because the healthcare services are the most important feature of the contract. See
Bill Watkins v. Air Vermont, Inc. (In re Air Vermont, Inc.), 44 B.R. 440, 444-45 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1984) (discussing in the analogous context of differentiating between a lease and a
security agreement, that the primary purpose of the agreement will prevail).
154 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
155 The business judgement rule leaves it up to the debtor to decide whether rejecting a
contract is beneficial. See In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 230 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1996); In re Beare Co., 177 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. W.D. Ten. 1994). The nondebtor
party has virtually no defense. See In re G Survivor Corp., 171 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994).
156 Of course, the residents will be paid for their claims; that is, cents on the dollar for
their already very reduced rejection claims. These are the claims for which they will have
standing. They can speak about how these miniscule amounts will be paid, but not about their
lack of a home and healthcare.
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994).
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the confirmation equation. 158 The unique fights created by the Bankruptcy
Code in sections 365 and 1129159 permit results in bankruptcy that could not
occur outside bankruptcy. 160 They also allow persons with smaller stakes in the
case to decide the fate of those with larger stakes. 161
2. Krupa's Bar and Grill and Short-Order Due Process
The sale of Krupa's to the strip joint could happen outside bankruptcy, but
it most likely could not happen as quickly or with as much protection to the
buyer. The complexities of the automatic stay, 162 the provision allowing assets
to be sold free and clear of liens and claims, 163 as well as the fast pace at which
bankruptcy cases proceed, will put the neighbors in this case at a severe
disadvantage.
Outside bankruptcy, the strip joint company could not buy Krupa's assets
without the possibility of being liable for future tort suits resulting from the
seller's negligent practices in the dissemination of alcohol. 164 State law
15 8 Voting in Chapter 11 is by majority rule, which is determined numerically in two
different ways. To be confirmed, a plan must be accepted by two-thirds in amount and one-
half in number of each creditor class entitled to vote on the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)
(1994). While it has been suggested that a balance of competing concerns be used, rather than
strict numeric voting, see GRoss, supra note 2, at 248, this is not the way Chapter 11
currently is written.
159 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1129 (1994).
160 While the Framers of the U.S. Coustitution sought to establish a legal system that
protected minority interests over the collective vote of the majority, see Girardeau A. Spann,
Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1975 (1990), Chapter 11 plan voting is less kind to
minority interests. See 11 U.S.C. 1126(c) (1994).
161 The stakes are smaller for creditors than for the facility residents because the
inability to find affordable, life-sustaining healthcare is more important than an inability to
obtain repayment of a debt. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1129(a)(13) (1994) (requiring that
a debtor who is reorganizing continue to pay employee health benefits under a Chapter 11
plan and indicating that health benefits are more important in some contexts than improving
the debtor's financial condition).
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
163 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1994).
164 If one continues the same enterprise of a prior owner of business assets, the new
owners can be liable for suits resulting from the prior owner's acts under state law successor
liability principles. See State of New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., Inc., 174 B.R.
366, 391 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). However, because bankruptcy permits sales free and clear of all
claims, one can eliminate successor liability through a bankruptcy court order so providing.
See Conway v. White Motor Corp., 885 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding Volvo not liable in
tort as a successor to White Motor Corp.); In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d 270, 274-75
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successor liability claims stand impervious to contractual provisions between the
buyer and seller. 165 Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, 166 however,
the assets can be sold free and clear of all claims relating to the prior use of the
assets, even if the buyer intends to operate a similar business. If the order
approving the sale specifically provides that successor liability claims cannot be
brought after the sale, the order will usually be upheld.167
The procedural issues raised by the automatic stay imposed by section
362168 are also likely to affect the neighbors' rights. Under section 362,169 one
may not bring any litigation against the debtor relating to a prepetition
obligation or activity of the debtor.170 Moreover, litigation relating to a
postpetition obligation must be brought before the bankruptcy court, rather than
another court. Although one technically could bring a postpetition action against
the debtor in another forum, the bankruptcy court can enjoin such a suit as an
interference with the ongoing rehabilitation efforts of the debtor.171 Even
though a good attorney might be able to convince the bankruptcy court to allow
a state court suit to proceed, in which injunction of such a sale might be sought,
she may not be able to achieve this result. 172 Thus, the most likely forum for
(6th Cir. 1985) ("All pre-petition claims and post-petition claims against White which have
not been filed with the Bankruptcy Court are barred by the statute and the orders of the lower
courts.").
16 5 See In re Lecde Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 585-87 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the bankruptcy court can extinguish successor liability claims by entering a "free and
clear" order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5)); In re White Motor Credit Corp., 761 F.2d at
274-75 (same). But see In re Savage Indus., Inc., 43 F.3d 714, 722-23 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that state successor liability claims are not extinguished when the plaintiff had no
notice of the sale, which is typical of claims that arise after the sale has been approved).
166 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994) (detailing when a trustee may sell property free and
clear of any interest other than the estate).
167 See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 761 F.2d at 274-75.
168 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (1994). Some might argue that as long as any forum is
available, there will not be a due process problem. There may be a due process problem,
however, if any other forum would be unable or unwilling to move as quickly as the
bankruptcy court. Moreover, all other actions are stayed at least temporarily. See id.
172 One may wonder why a judge would permit such litigation to be pursued while the
debtor is trying to put its affairs in order. Moreover, the neighbors may be unable to find a
good attorney on such short notice in this highly specialized area. They also may run into
difficulties raising funds for attorney's fees. As one scholar has noted, "[m]echanisms for
protecting... entitlements may not exist-and for two reasons: first, the legislature may not
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the neighbors' complaints is bankruptcy court and not another forum that would
otherwise be available if not for the bankruptcy. As will be discussed in Part
m.C, however, the bankruptcy forum does not know exactly what to do with
the neighbors' interests. 173
The problems posed by certain Code provisions, such as facilitative sale
provisions and litigation issues relating to the automatic stay are further
exacerbated by the speed with which a bankruptcy sale can be approved. 174
Again, this fact about bankruptcy is what makes it so effective-not to mention
appealing-to buyers, sellers, and creditors. However, it will be very hard for
the neighbors to get organized and obtain representation before the sale is
approved. It is unlikely that there will be much time to accomplish anything in
another forum before the bankruptcy court rules on the sale. In the bankruptcy
forum, it is unlikely that the neighbors' concerns about a deteriorating
neighborhood will be taken seriously, or considered at all, in deciding whether
to approve the sale to the highest bidder.
The neighbors do not hold bankruptcy claims. Even if they merely wanted
to organize their own bid, the brief twenty-day notice of sale required by the
Bankruptcy Rules will provide little time to do so. Thus, the entire sale could be
approved before their interests have ever been considered. Bankruptcy was
never intended to create greater rights in creditors than they receive under state
law. Yet, Krupa's bankruptcy could create such rights at the expense of third
parties.
3. Fancy Pants and the State of the American Wage Earner
a. The Fancy Pants Workers
The employees of Fancy Pants are, in some respects, far better protected in
bankruptcy than the neighbors of Krupa's or the residents of San Gobin.
have determined who has a right of action; second, the holders of entitlements may not have
the funds to press their claims in the bankruptcy case." See Rapoport, supra note 2, at 837
n.224.
173 See infra notes 223-303 and accompanying text.
174 Bankiptcy Rule 2002 requires only twenty days notice of most matters in a Chapter
11 case. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002. This rule regarding short notice is beneficial to
everyone in the case except for the neighbors. It makes the proceeding quicker and less
expensive for creditors and the debtor, but could make it very difficult for the neighbors to
obtain competent representation in time to stop the sale.
[Vol. 59:429
NONECONOMIC INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Employees already are entitled to a host of special privileges in bankruptcy.175
They receive special priority for a portion of unpaid wages and benefits, 176
their benefits must be continued in a reorganization plan, 177 and, if they are
unionized, their collective bargaining agreements may not be rejected unless
stringent standards are met. 178 Moreover, unlike the parties seeking to pursue
nonpecuniary interests in the other two examples, the employees of Fancy Pants
are not necessarily worse off as a result of the bankruptcy.
179
However, many workers can be fired for no reason at all both in and
outside bankruptcy. 180 In light of this fact, it is not surprising that employees
generally have no right to be heard with respect to the future of their jobs. 181
175 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (providing priority treatment for wages and
benefits); 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994) (making it very difficult to reject a collective bargaining
agreement); 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (requiring the maintenance of employee benefits while
in Chapter 11).
176 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
177 See 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
17 8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). In Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel
Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986), the court emphasized
that the requirements of § 1113(b)(1) are in the conjunctive. Accordingly, a Bankruptcy Court
must determine whether a debtor's proposal both "provides for those necessary modifications
in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assures that all the creditors, the debtor and all affected parties are treated fairly
and equitably." Id. at 1086 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1994)).
The Court of Appeals specifically determined that the term "necessary" within the
meaning of § 1113(b)(1)(A) is synonymous with the term essential. Thus, only those
modifications to a collective bargaining agreement limited to the short-term goal of preventing
a debtor's liquidation, as opposed to broader modifications intended to insure the long-term
economic health of the debtor, will be permitted. See id.
179 When businesses are sold outside bankruptcy, employees do not necessarily receive
any special treatment.
180 See Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment At Will: When
Should Courts Defer to the Legislature, 72 NEB. L. REv. 956, 959 (1993) (discussing the
evolution of employment at will); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679 (1994)
(same).
181 'Me Bankruptcy Code does provide some protections to workers with respect to
future employment. An example is the provisions protecting collective bargaining agreements.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). Additionally, the debtor must comply with certain
nonbankruptcy laws protecting workers. See, e.g., Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994) (known as "WARN Act" and requiring
that employers provide a 60 day notice of plant closings and mass layoffs); see also Hotel
Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Assoc., 724 F.Supp. 333, 336 (D.N.J.
1989) (upholding WARN Act obligations in bankruptcy).
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Yet the consequences of accepting the first offer for Fancy Pants are severe
with respect to both Fancy Pants's work force and other members of the
community. Plant closings affect large numbers of people and should be
avoided under most circumstances. 182 Obviously, this does not mean that a
court should accept a $500,000 offer that saves jobs over a $5,000,000 one that
does not. However, some balance of competing interests is needed. Enormous
dollar differences in bankruptcy may require that the highest offer be accepted.
When the differences are not so large, balancing becomes necessary. An
examination of employee interests illustrates how expanding bankruptcy court
standing could have a positive influence on areas of law beyond bankruptcy.
b. Worker Rights in General: A Dire Call for Action
[TMhose who have nothing to sell but their labour remain in the weakest
possible bargaining position. 183
182 Obviously, there are exceptions, for example, if the plant is causing extensive
pollution, that is harming local (or not so local) residents. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 25, at
1091-92 (discussing the options available to balance the goals of saving jobs with that of
saving the environment and claiming that such decisions must be made by the legislature).
183 E. F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAu'rruL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATERED
67-68 (1973). As the court in Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E. 2d 685, 704
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952) stated:
The average, individual employee has little but his labor to sell or to use to make a
living. He is often in urgent need of selling it and in no position to object to boiler plate
restrictive covenants placed before him to sign. To him, the right to work and support
his family is the most important right he possesses. His individual bargaining power is
seldom equal to that of his employer.
See id. at 704.
The world of bankruptcy scholarship has grown fond of the bargain theory and model.
Some scholars rely heavily on the concept of freedom to bargain and contract. See, e.g.,
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-48 (1979) (stating that secured creditors bargain for
collateral, and unsecured creditors respond to their lack of collateral by demanding a premium
or higher interest rate). Other scholars doubt that parties actually bargain for their position in
a debtor's debt structure. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA.
L. REv. 1887, 1896 (1994) (stating that many unsecured debt holders do not agree to issue
credit to the debtor but are instead involuntary creditors such as tort victims, former spouses,
government agencies, educational lending agencies, health care providers, tax authorities,
landlords, and utilities). The questions become: Who bargained for what? Should she be held
to the bargain? Did she have an opportunity to bargain?
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I have argued that a corporation's fiduciary responsibilities run to parties
other than shareholders. 184 If these fiduciary responsibilities exist, they extend
to a corporation's employees, both inside and outside bankruptcy.' 8 5 In his
article, The Responsible Board, Wall Street attorney Ira Millstein devotes much
of his discussion to ways in which corporations can reduce the harm caused by
the replacement of human capital with technological efficiencies.' 86 Millstein
acknowledges that when a course of action causes serious dislocation, the
corporation is expected to consider alternatives. 187
Corporate America, however, does not seem to be getting the message. 188
When it comes to wages and employee benefits, American workers are on a
downward spiral.189 Workers now receive less wages for the same work than
Along the same lines, many employees with nonpecuniary interests to assert in
bankruptcy did not bargain for their position with the debtor. See, e.g., Shannon Browne,
Note, Labor-Management Teams: A Panacea for American Businesses or the Rebirth of
Laborer's Nightmares?, 58 OHo ST. L.J. 241, 269 (1997) (discussing unions' ability to
equalize bargaining power); Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-Professional
Exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. U.L. REv. 139, 166-74 (1993) (noting
that even professional and managerial workers often lack real bargaining power); see also Lea
S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's Consciences
and Women's Fidelity, 101 YAE L.J. 775, 852 (1992) ("Most individuals enter employment
contracts with hopes and dreams. Few enter with the end of the relationship clearly in
mind.).
184 See supra Part II.B.
185 See generally Milistein, supra note 49, at 408-17 (discussing corporate
responsibilities to the public and employees).
186 See id. (discussing the inevitability of downsizing in light of technological
efficiencies and providing some examples).
187 See id. at 413. He then suggests several alternatives. One possibility is that the board
consider whether the proposed layoffs are necessary at all, and if so, whether there is a way
to soften the blow. For example, during the Depression, Sears and Kellogg cut all working
hours by 25% to avoid layoffs. See id. Another option is to give company stock to those being
laid off. See id. at 414. Still another approach, recently taken by AT&T, is to acknowledge
publicly that the layoffs are not merit-based, publicly praise the former workers, and provide
them with job counselling and new training. See id Additionally, companies can offer
continuing health care benefits and portable pension plans. See id.
188 See generally W6LMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60 (discussing the propensity for
companies to seek cheap labor outside the United States, thus reducing wage earning capacity
among Americans).
189 See id. at 168-83.
For those who earn their living from work, real wages (money wages corrected for
inflation) have been stagnant since 1973 .... [Alinual wages held up better than did
hourly wages, only because there was rapid growth in the number of hours each worker
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ever before on a standard-of-living basis.190 They also have far less job
security. 191 There is more downsizing, more economic uncertainty, and far
fewer safety nets. 192 Even some mainstream economists now acknowledge that
put in, as the growth rate in the amount of capital supplied to each worker declined, and
production became more labor intensive.
Id. at 169. Moreover, U.S. wages have fallen more than 20% in the last 22 years. See David
Pearce Snyder, The Revolution in the Workplace: Wa!'s Happening to Our Jobs?, FuruIsr
(Mar.-Apr. 1996), at 8-13. Today nearly one-fifth of America's 85 million full-time
employees earn less than a poverty wage; for people between the ages of 18 and 24, the
numbers are even more shocking: 47% hold full-time jobs that pay less than a poverty
income. See id.
190 See id.; Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfeld, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions
of Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al. According to these authors:
More than 43 million jobs have been erased in the United States since
1979 .... Many of the losses come from the normal churning as stores fail and
factories move. And far more jobs have been created than lost over that period. But
increasingly the jobs that are disappearing are those of higher-paid, white-collar workers.
Id. Moreover, only thirty-five percent of laid-off workers find jobs that pay as much as or
more than their prior job. See id. at 26.
191 See WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 70-73. Reengineering has become
synonymous with fear of job loss. Wage stagnation causes further workplace degradation
which is exacerbated by a complete lack ofjob security in existing corporate America. See id.
192 See Elizabeth Kolbert & Adam Clymer, The Politics of Layoffs: In Search of a
Message, N.Y. Tnvms, Mar. 8, 1996, at Al, A22 (evaluating political approaches to the
downsizing problem and what role economic concerns would have on the outcome of the
1996 Presidential election); see also WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 57-85;
Diane Crispell, Replacing Displaced Earnings, AM. DEMOGRAPHICs, Sept. 1997, at 39-40
(stating that three in ten workers displaced between 1993 and 1995 earned at least 25% less
than they did before being laid off, and that the number is even greater among older
employees). Another obvious change in the workforce is the proliferation of part-time work,
as demonstrated by the UPS strike. See Robert T. Garrett, Teamsters to Return, Strike Gives
Lift to Labor Movement, CouRiER-JouRNAL (Louisville), Aug. 20, 1997, at Al (noting that
many companies, such as Kmart, Home Depot, and Sears asked President Clinton to
intervene to stop the UPS strike because they use a lot of part-time workers and did not want
the issue highlighted). As one journalist noted:
Working people have every reason to be nervous. In California, job loss in the last
decade has been concentrated in high-skilled, high-wage industries like aerospace,
defense, heavy manufacturing and communications. Meanwhile, if you're looking for
the next decade's growth industries, you'll go to work as a relatively low-wage cashier,
janitor, retail sales clerk or waiter. More and more, new jobs don't provide the same
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our unique form of capitalism has spun out of control, with more and more
national resources being devoted to investment capital and fewer to human
capital. 193
It seems that American corporations would rather maximize profits-which
incidentally are at an all-time high-than invest in the future of American
wages. 194 The situation is further exacerbated by the world banks, which avoid
inflation at all costs, even if doing so permanently deflates wages. 195 This
security as the old ones. Few workers needed the UPS strike to teach them that the jobs
of the '90s are increasingly temporary or part-time.
The rich get richer and the rest of us take on a second job just to stay in place. It's
not surprising that bankruptcies are up and credit card debt is at record levels.
Art Pulaski, If Thisis Prosperity, Where's Mine?, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1997, at B5.
193 See WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 17-32. Although profits for
American corporations are higher than ever before, average Americans are not benefitting.
See id. Rather, the end of the cold war has made cheaper labor available world-wide, severely
minimizing the value of American labor. See id. at 23. In the post-cold war information age,
labor and capital need no longer remain together. Instead, corporations can spend more
purchasing fixed assets abroad, to be used by foreign labor. See id. at 23-29.
194 See Felix Rohatyn, Clinton's Growth Agenda, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at A18
(explaining that corporate America may want to avoid high growth and low unemployment to
avoid potential inflation). The problem of downsizing and the decline of well-paying jobs is
described in statistical detail in Geman, supra note 47, at 371-75.
195 Central banks such as the Federal Reserve in the United States and Bundesbank in
Germany
are allowing global capital to run wild.... Their analysts are quite willing to tolerate
growth rates of over 5 percent per year in emerging countries while refusing to condone
fast growth in the industrial world if the perceived threat of even the slightest whiff of
inflation is a consequence. Instead of balancing the interests of those who owe money
and those who are owed money, they have consented to run the economy of the
industrial world in such a way that the interests of debtors-most young working
families, no matter how high their income from work may be-are sacrificed to the
interests of creditors-the bankers and people who live, and have lived for a long time
off capital invested in the bond and equity markets.
WOLMAN & CoLAMiOscA, supra note 60, at 142.
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inevitably favors creditors over debtors, 196 who have difficulty paying debts
with unexpectedly stagnant incomes. 197
Regardless of the causes, we are witnessing the worst of American
employment policies, policies that threaten to make the vast majority of the
American workforce obsolete. 198 American corporations no longer need
American workers, 199 which has caused what one author has described as a
"decoupling or inversion of corporate needs and human needs." 20° These
trends cannot be economically efficient, given the staggering costs of such a
policy to society as a whole.201 According to William Wolman and Anne
Colamosca, authors of The Judas Economy, these costs include not only lower
incomes and standards of living but also
"the moral upheaval of losing a community, of trust betrayed. While other
studies have documented it among the laid-off, I found it as strongly among
those who remained employed." In an analysis of an actual company that he
renames "Glover," [Rutgers University labor expert Charles] Heckscher finds
that among the people who stayed on after the downsizing, the changes were
"deeper, both harder to see and more profound. Along with cost and waste, the
transformation also eliminated, or at least damaged, the links among
people .... The organization therefore became more rigid and bureaucratic
than ever before. "202
196 1 recognize that this statement is simplistic and overstated. In reality, most creditors
are also debtors to other creditors. My statement refers primarily to "institutional" creditors,
who clearly benefit at the expense of individual debtors.
197 See WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 7, 179. Americans who wish to
maintain their standard of living in light of reduced wages can do so only by taking on more
and more debt, thereby further reducing disposable income to an all-time low. See id. at 179.
198 See id. at 107-38 (stating that even elite workers, who in the past had far fewer
reasons to fear job displacement, are now experiencing less job security, downsizing, and
increased unemployment rates).
199 See id. at 87-106 (discussing the huge number of educated workers available to
American companies in India alone).
200 See (-eman, supra note 47, at 379. Geman refers here to the inversion of the
corporation's initial purpose, which is to serve the public good, and its current role which
often is to subordinate the needs of individuals and communities to the needs of corporations.
201 See id. at 112; see also Rick Bragg, Big Holes Where the Dignity Used to Be, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al.
202 See WOIMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 112 (citing CHR s HEcKSCHER,
WHITE COLLAR BLuEs: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN AN AGE OF CoRPORATE
REVrRucrRIG 168 (1995)). This in turn has affected overall productivity. See id. Another
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People naturally do not perform at their highest level when they are under
stress, which is why some scholars and commentators believe that workers in
many other countries have become more productive than American workers. 203
This is inefficient on a number of fronts, although efficiency itself seems trivial
in light of the resulting human condition.
We do not need an economist to confirm these work conditions. We have
seen them ourselves. Nor do we need an economist to tell us that a national
condition such as this can only get worse; economist Franz Schumacher
author agrees, noting that layoffs are harmful to both those being fired and those doing the
firing:
An executive recruiter reported visiting a manager who had just gone through
several rounds of firing immediate subordinates. Previously a strong take-charge
executive, he was now smoking, had lost weight, was unable to look the recruiter in the
eye, and seemed extremely nervous. For another executive who had previously
eliminated thousands of jobs, the need to put several thousand more former colleagues
out on the street resulted in a loss of appetite and difficulty sleeping. He began breaking
out in spontaneous fits of crying and one day couldn't get out of bed.
Those who achieve the pinnacles of financial and professional success in America
seldom lack for physical comforts. They are learning, however, that no amount of
money can buy peace of mind, a strong and loving family, caring friends, and a feeling
that one is doing meaningful and important work.
DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RuLE TE WORLD 243 (1995).
203 See WOLMAN & COIAMoscA, supra note 60, at 97 (discussing the high energy of
Indian workers compared to American workers). U.S. productivity for the hundred-year
period following the Civil War has averaged a 2.2% increase per year. See id. at 73. From
the fourth quarter of 1993 through the fourth quarter of 1995, the average yearly gain has
been 1.1%. Id. While productivity has risen in the first quarter of 1997 to 2.0%, see Michael
Mandel et al., How Long Can This Last?, Bus. WK., May 19, 1997, at 31, productivity
increases in other industrialized nations including Germany, France, Italy, and Britain have
been equal to or better than the U.S. numbers for the past five years. See Gene Koretz,
America's Edge in Wages, Bus. WK., June 30, 1997, at 32.
The notion that American workers are not the most productive in the world is
controversial, even shocking to some. See, e.g., Michael Avramovich, Note, Intercompany
Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code Section 482: The Noose Tightens
on Multinational Coiporations, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915, 918 n.14 (1995) (quoting
secretary of Commerce Ron Brown as stating that "American workers are the most
productive in the world"); Paul R. Verkuil, Is Effident Government an Oxymoron?, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1221, 1221 (1994) (stating that American workers are the most productive in the world).
Because there is little job security in the United States, compared to other industrialized
nations, many people think that workers are far more likely to work harder to ensure
continued employment. See WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 71. This is not the
way it seems to be working out, however. See id. at 97.
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explained why, long before corporate downsizing began.2 04 Meaningful life
work is necessary on a large scale for the long-term sustainability of meaningful
human existence.205 Human capital is perhaps the most sustainable form of
capital, although its value is neither realized, recognized, nor appreciated.206
20 4 The Gross National Product may rise rapidly even though people may find
themselves oppressed by increasing frustration, alienation, insecurity, and so forth. See
SCHIJMACrR, supra note 183, at 27 ("After a while, even the Gross National Product
refuses to rise any further... because of a creeping paralysis of non-cooperation, as
expressed in various types of escapism on the part, not only of oppressed and exploited, but
even of highly privileged groups.").
205 See id. As Schumacher noted:
If a man has no chance of obtaining work he is in a desperate position, not simply
because he lacks an income but because he lacks this nourishing and enlivening factor of
disciplined work which nothing can replace. A modem economist may engage in highly
sophisticated calculations on whether full employment "pays" or whether it might be
more economic to run an economy at less than full employment so as to ensure a greater
mobility of labor, a better stability of wages, and so forth. His fundamental criterion of
success is simply the total quantity of goods produced during a given period of time.
... This is standing the truth on its head by considering goods as more important
than people ....
Id. at 51. See also Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Human Nature and Their Implications
for Business Organizations, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 236 (1996) (stating that society's
obsession with economic growth thwarts personal filfillment and decreases employees'
fulfillment); KORTEN, supra note 202, at 243.
206 See WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 77 (noting that corporations can
choose between using more human capital or more currency capital). One scholar has
suggested that employers do not invest more heavily in human capital because existing
doctrinal limitations on enforceability of the assignment of human capital discourage, or at
least fail to encourage, such investment. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of
Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REv. 383, 387 (1993). Sterk argues, for example, that employers
would be far more likely to invest in human capital in the form of training, higher wages, and
more job security, if they could in tam enforce covenants not to compete. See id. at 412. As
Sterk explains:
In the employment context, alienability of human capital is more limited than
alienability of more traditional property in at least two ways. First, a contract to work
for a particular employer is not specifically enforceable: an employer who attempts to
"buy" an employee's services for a period of time may not secure "property-rule"
protection of the "property" he has attempted to purchase. Second, even more limited
protection-the right to prevent a former employee from working for a competitor-is
available only when the firm can persuade the court of a strong economic justification for
enforcing the bargain. The existence of a bargain that both parties apparently believed
beneficial is not by itself enough to secure judicial enforcement. These restrictions on a
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Although the problem of noneconomic interests in bankruptcy certainly
pales in comparison to labor conditions in general, the two are not entirely
unrelated. 207 Large Chapter 11 cases did not cause the reduced job status many
Americans now face, nor can implementing new procedures in these cases
solve these complex problems. Implementing such procedures might, however,
avoid making the problem worse.
This is not to say that employees should run Chapter 11 cases. They should
merely have a right to be heard on issues affecting their future employment.
The plight of workers, and their resulting need for a voice in bankruptcy
proceedings, was recently recognized by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, which proposed that employee committees be appointed to
represent these interests. 208 Regardless of the particular mechanism used, this
person's ability to alienate his own human capital have been justified in part by the need
to discourage anticompetitive behavior, in part by the need to protect employees from the
greater bargaining power of employers, and, most significantly, by the need to protect
individual freedom. None of those justifications, however, is entirely persuasive.
Id. Perhaps the law in other areas, such as employment law, should be readjusted to
encourage a greater investment in human capital.
2 07 Large numbers of employees are affected by bankruptcy. The number of employees
and retirees affected by bankruptcy filings in the United States is not counted, but several
figures provide insight into the dimensions of this group of individuals. The following table
shows the number of employees in some of the largest bankruptcies filed over the past several
years:
Nwnber .F E ployee
Restaurant Enterprises Group 36,750
Carter Hawley Hale Stores 36,000





See GRoss, supra note 2, at 81.
208 Recognizing the precarious position of employees in Chapter 11 cases, the NBRC
appointed a working group to consider how to increase employee participation in bankruptcy
cases. As Commissioner Babette Ceccotti stated:
Given the well-established purpose of Chapter 11 to preserve jobs, participation by
employees and their representatives in the reorganization process should be accepted and
encouraged. Instead, representatives of employees and retirees and employee benefit
funds have faced impediments to active participation in bankrptcy cases despite their
recognized status as creditors and parties in interest. These obstacles take many forms,
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right to be heard would be fairly easy to provide, and far less radical than many
proposed solutions to workers' plights. For example, after U.S. Steel closed its
two plants in Youngstown, Ohio, and refused to sell the plant to its workforce
at a fair market price, Professor Joseph Singer argued that a new property right
should be recognized in the workers, based on relational contract theories and
joint production and ownership of the plant.209
What I propose here is far more modest: employees' right to be heard on
matters involving their future employment. At this time, I am not proposing that
any other noncreditor group receive an automatic right to be heard, nor do I
believe that employees should have open-ended representation and standing to
speak on every issue in a case, as I understand the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission's proposal to do. Instead, I propose a limited representation for
employees through appropriate Bankruptcy Code amendments. 210
such as a lack of notice of a bankruptcy filing, fhilure to include debts owed to
employees and benefit funds of the debtor's schedules and skepticism by the U.S.
Tmstee's office in the creditors' committee appointment process regarding claims held
by unions or benefit funds. Employees not represented by a labor organization face
additional obstacles due to the lack of collective representation. Because reorganizations
typically involve significant business decisions affecting employees, the bankruptcy
process should more readily accommodate participation by employees and their
representatives.
See NBRC Report, supra note 109, at 502. The committee report acknowledged that when
employees were also creditors, there was less of a need to provide additional representation.
The NBRC later implies that appointing a committee for employees is an appropriate solution,
if employees are not otherwise able to participate (e.g., if they are not creditors). See id. at
506.
209 As will be discussed in subsection C.l.a, we ultimately may decide that a new
property right should be recognized in certain claimants. See infra notes 230-40 and
accompanying text. See generally Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40
STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988) (arguing that employees should be entitled to new property rights
based on the contributions they have made to the enterprise in which they have worked).
210 'Me NBRC's report does not specify on which issues employees may be heard. See
NBRC Report, supra note 109, at 455 (providing that "employee creditor committees be
encouraged in appropriate circumstances as a mechanism to resolve claims and other matters
affecting the employees in a Chapter 11 case," but specifying no particular limitation on the
participation of such committees). While forming employee committees seems to be a good
idea, providing employees standing on all issues in every case would be too broad in my
opinion. Instead, Bankruptcy Rule 2018 could be amended specifically to provide that
employees have the right to be heard on any issue involving their future employment. This
rule currently gives unionized employees the right to be heard, through a representative, but
only in connection with confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. See FD. R. BANKR. P. 2018(d).
The rule does not apply in any context other than Chapter 11 plan confirmation. See id.
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Although unionized employees already have a right to be heard under
Bankruptcy Rule 2018 in connection with a plan or reorganization, they do not
have a right to appeal the confirmation order.211 Thus, I propose that the rights
of workers to be heard on issues affecting future employment be expanded in
three ways. First, the right to be heard in connection with the plan should
extend to all employees, not just unionized workers.212 Second, there should be
a right to appeal any court order relating to an issue of future employment, just
as any other order can be appealed by any party with standing. 213 Finally, and
perhaps most important, the right to be heard should extend to sales of a
debtor's assets. Asset sales are very common in bankruptcy, perhaps more
common than continued ownership of the business by existing shareholders. 214
If the business is being or could be sold as a going concern, employees might
have an opportunity to continue their employment.215 As a result, the issue of
future employment probably arises more frequently in the context of asset sales
than any other bankruptcy issue. Employees should have an automatic right to
be heard on the issue of their future employment, in order to avoid exacerbating
the current employment situation in this country.
211 See FED. R. BANK. P. 2018(d) ("A labor union or employees' association which
exercises its right to be heard under the subdivision shall not be entitled to appeal any
judgment, order, or decree relating to the plan, unless otherwise permitted by law."). No
other law provides such a right, leaving even unionized employees with no right to appeal the
court's order approving a plan over their objections.
2 12 See id. (In a Chapter 11 case, "a labor union or employees' association,
representative of employees of the debtor, shall have the right to be heard on the economic
soundness of a plan affecting the interests of the employees."). This phrase has been
interpreted as limiting the right to be heard to organized employees, although under the
former section of the Act most similar to this rule, § 206, all employees had a right to be
heard. There is no indication in the legislative history of Rule 2018 that Congress intended a
major departure from § 206. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.AN. 5787, 5902.
2 13 This right must be specifically provided because, for some reason, the right of
unionized workers to appeal a confirmation order on an issue related to their employment was
specifically excluded from Rule 2018. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018. There is no legislative
history indicating why the typical right of appeal was eliminated. In fact, the only legislative
history with respect to Rule 2018 relates to its procedures regarding intervention. See S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5902; In re Marin Motor
Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 1982).
214 See Warren, supra note 27, at 788.
215 Obviously, if the assets must be sold piecemeal to more than one buyer, and the
company will not remain operational, employees could not maintain their current employment
in any event. In a clear-cut case, for example, where no buyer can be found for the going
concern business after a reasonable time, employees may not need a right to be heard.
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This suggested modification is modest, particularly when compared to other
proposals such as shifting our definition of a bankruptcy claim.2 16 When
Professor Singer suggested that workers employed by U.S. Steel receive a
recognized property right in the steel plants, 2 17 there was no real alternative to
allowing the plant to close. 218 U.S. Steel did not wish to sell its plant and no
one could force it to do so.219 In the Fancy Pants example, however, the
business in issue was for sale. Moreover, there was a second offer for the assets
that was close in size to the larger offer. 220 Thus, there was an alternative
means of taking workers' rights into account that was not present in the U.S.
Steel case. 221 The proposed amendments could make a real difference to large
numbers of workers affected by large Chapter 11 cases and to the communities
in which they work.
No global solution to the state of American workers appears on the
horizon. 222 But there may be small steps that could improve the situation. As
2 16 See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 209.
2 18 By this, I mean no alternative under existing law. Professor Singer argued in favor of
creating a new property right in the enterprise, in favor of the workers. See id. at 619.
However, unlike a typical business in Chapter 11, the plants involved in the U.S. Steel case
were not for sale, and the presiding judge found no justification for forcing their current
owners to sell them involuntarily. Moreover, because the assets were not for sale, there was
no competing or second bid that could be accepted in order to keep the business operational.2 19 See id. at 620. Although both the district and circuit court judges felt the company
had a moral obligation to do so, neither felt there was a legislative or common law precedent
to force the company to do so. See id.
220 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
221 Because anyone with money or access to money can bid on a debtor's assets,
workers already have the right in bankruptcy to do what Singer proposed, namely to buy a
debtor's assets. They do not have any right to request additional time to put together such a
bid, however, or the right to argue that saving local jobs will add value to a bid, which I
believe they should have.
222 For a discussion of some thought-provoking new ideas addressing these problems,
see generally Geman, supra note 47, at 402-05. Geman suggests that the rights employees
generally receive, such as the right to minimum wage, be expanded to include health care
rights, which would be portable from job to job. She also suggests that identity and physical
communities of workers be formed, through which workers can collectively negotiate
workplace benefits, form skills training centers and other network communities, and discuss
other aspects of employment. These communities could fill the void left by many unionized
jobs that have been eliminated, see id. at 370 n.6, and address the concerns of a much larger
percentage of the workforce. While these suggestions may seem somewhat idealistic and may
produce little immediate change in the workplace, over time they could improve the
workplace.
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bankruptcy judges, practitioners, legislators, and scholars, we can assist in
making small changes in the way American workers are treated-changes that
could be significant over the long term. The question is how best to consider
these employee and other interests in the context of the existing bankruptcy
system.
C. Voices in the Wilderness
Although this Article has discussed nonpecuniary interests and why they
should be heard in bankruptcy proceedings, it has not identified the underlying
purpose for giving nonpecuniary interests a voice in Chapter 11 cases. 223 How
will this opportunity of expression provide more substantive rights? Should we
merely hear how these nonpecuniary rights are being affected? Should the goal
be to compensate or credit224 persons for their losses or are there methods of
considering these interests that fall between these extremes? Among the options
available for addressing these unconventional claims in bankruptcy are: (1)
converting these nonpecuniary rights into pecuniary rights, by redefining
property rights and liabilities, and then compensating persons for their newly-
pecuniary losses;225 (2) weighing nonpecuniary rights on equal footing with
pecuniary rights, for the limited purpose of hearing these positions;226 (3)
providing a voice in the proceeding for its own sake;227 or (4) mandating
consideration of these interests as long as doing so does not interfere with
pecuniary interests.228
223 At least one judge has found it acceptable to consider public interests without
identifying a particular purpose or method for doing so:
It is not necessary for present purposes to define exactly when, how, and to what
extent the consideration of the public interest may be a determinative factor in the
conduct and the resolution of these reorganization proceedings. It suffices to note that it
is at least arguable that the public interest factor still must be considered by the
reorganization court in a case having a manifest public impact.
In re Public Serv. of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. at 556 (Yacos, Bankruptcy J.) (footnotes
omitted).
224 In most situations, such interests would not actually be paid, but the holders would
instead receive credit for their interests that could be balanced against the economic claims of
creditors.
225 See infra notes 230-69 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 270-82 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
228 See infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
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1. Redefining Property and Debt
To ask courts to consider nonpecuniary interests in bankruptcy is to ask
them to compare apples and oranges. Although it is easy to suggest in the
abstract that courts consider nonpecuniary interests when making decisions, it is
far more difficult to provide specific guidance to courts regarding how this
should be done.
Under existing law, courts may not make decisions that benefit
nonpecuniary interests, if the result will be a lower recovery for existing
creditors, without violating the existing priority system.229 In the example of the
two bids for Fancy Pants, the courts could not accept the lower bid if it reduced
recovery to creditors. Yet the overall economic benefits to the community in
which Fancy Pants operates would be far greater if the lower bid were
accepted. Over time, far more dollars might be created through continuing
employment, which would make their way back into the local community.
Other economic benefits also would be realized. As discussed previously, job
displacement has high societal costs, many of which are borne by the general
public, even at times when social welfare systems are on the decline. Given
these realities, in order to give nonpecuniary interests proper treatment, we may
need to change the way in which we define assets and liabilities. We may
simply be defining property and debt in a far too limited way.
a. Singer's .Reliance Interest in Property
One way to create a system that considers a worker's right to continued
employment is to define that right as a property right.230 Professor Singer
proposes such a shift in the definition of property. 231 He argues that when U.S.
Steel closed its two Youngstown, Ohio plants, it terminated an employment
relationship that had developed over a long period of time-a relationship upon
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994). The Code measures success primarily in terms of
"maximum payouts to creditors from the available assets which are to be distributed
according to the Code priority scheme." Hon. Leif M. Clark, What Constitutes Success in
Chapter 11?: A Round Table Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 229, 233 (1994)
(quoting Hon. Robert C. McGuire). Consequently, if a court considers the losses of various
community or employee interests to be valued at $400,000, the court apparently may not-
without the kinds of adjustments to the law suggested in this Article--deprive existing
creditors of any dollars in order to take the $400,000 losses into account.
230 See Singer, supra note 209, at 621.
231 See id.
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which an entire geographic region had come to rely.232 According to Singer, a
property right arose in these workers as a result of this long-established
relationship. 233 This right created an entitlement. In bankruptcy terms, one
could define this entitlement as a claim.2 34 Admittedly, this is not the type of
claim that bankruptcy law currently recognizes, but that is not to say that such a
right could not be recognized, given the proper limitations.
Although Singer acknowledges that past work does not currently create a
property right, he argues that a joint enterprise is created through the owner's
assets and the workers' labor, which could justify protection of the nonowner
party to the enterprise. 235 Recognizing the vulnerability of both workers and
other members of the communities in which they work, Singer argues that
companies must be required to balance and consider competing types of
interests when making corporate decisions that affect these interests.236 He
argues that we must be able to encourage desirable economic change without
leaving a wasteland of social misery in its wake.237
2 32 See id. at 618-23. As Singer recounts: "Everything that has happened in the
Mahoning Valley has been happening for many years because of steel.... And to
accommodate that industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that community were
based and planned on the basis of that institution: Steel." Id. at 618 (quoting Local 1330,
United Steel Wkrs. v. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d 1264, 1279 (6th Cir. 1980)).
233 See id. at 657.
234 Section 101(10)(C) of the Code recognizes that a creditor can possess a community
claim; a "claim" is defined as a present right to be paid. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994)
(defining a "creditor" as a person holding a claim arising under various Bankruptcy Code
provisions or a person holding a "community claim"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (1994)
(defining a "claim" as a right of payment or equitable remedy based on state law). Under
existing law, current workers have no right to be employed in the future unless a contract
provides otherwise. See Singer, supra note 209, at 657.
235 See Singer, supra note 209, at 657-59.
236 See id. at 661. This is in effect no different than other types of mutually dependent
property relationships such as the landlord/tenant relationship. See id. at 679-84.
237 See id. at 719-20. Singer is not alone in his focus on the concerns of workers in the
context of plant closings. Many studies have been done in order to measure the economic and
other harms caused by plant closings. For the most part, these studies confirm that workers
who are displaced from diminishing industries experience more loss of income than other
displaced workers, and that they have more difficulty moving into other employment
opportunities. See Mary Ellen Benedict & Peter Vander Hart, Reemployment Differences
Among Dislocated and Other Workers, 56 AM. J. ECON. & SocaoLoGy 1, 2 (1997) (finding
that workers displaced from declining industries are often unable to move into stable or
growth areas, and if they do, these jobs often do not compensate them as well, causing a loss
of wages and human capital); Bruce C. Fallick, A Review of the Recent Empirical Literature
on Displaced Workers, 50 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REv. 5, 5-6 (1996) (reviewing recent
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The same argument can be made in the context of important bankruptcy
decisions that affect enormous varieties of nonpecuniary interests. 238 We must
be able to deal with prevailing social problems within our legal system in order
to avoid leaving a messy wake of greater societal waste in the name of
maximizing values for creditors.239 Singer argues for an extension of existing
property law, based on analogous principles in tort and contract law. These
changes in the law, he argues, are justified by changing social values and
changing social conditions. 24°
Similar changes are taking place in today's bankruptcy arena. Large
Chapter 11 cases are more prevalent than they once were and a greater number
of people are affected by them. Social welfare programs and other system-wide
safety nets are also becoming less prevalent, which might justify developing
other legal systems to compensate for these losses. Finally, wage earners are
making less money than ever, are working harder, and are enjoying less job
security than at any time in recent history. These changes may justify a change
in the way in which we currently define property. On the other side of the
balance sheet, they also may justify a change in the way we define and
prioritize debt.
b. Redefining Debt
When we conceptualize debt, we necessarily think about hierarchies of
debt: debt collateralized by security, debt entitled to priority, and garden-variety
debt that enjoys no special status. Law and Economics scholars have succinctly
explained these just deserts. Secured creditors are entitled to their superior
position because they bargained for and received the collateral, just as all other
creditors could have done.241 Unsecured creditors, they claim, can simply
empirical studies of displaced workers, confirming that loss of wages from displacement is
persistent over time, and that displacement is thought to disrupt lives, foul hard-earned
expectations, waste human resources, and thrust the burden of economic adjustment on an
unlucky few); Ann Huff Stevens, Persistent Effects of Job Displacement: The Importance of
Multiple Job Loss, 15 J.L. & ECON. 165, 175 (1997) (finding that once displaced, workers
have difficulty maintaining employment and have a permanent loss of income).
238 See Singer, supra note 209, at 699-701.
239 We already allow creditors' claims to be forsaken, to some extent, when we allow
Chapter 11 debtors to use cash collateral against a creditor's wishes, or approve a priming
lien. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363-364 (1994).
240 See Singer, supra note 209, at 636-37.
241 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 183, at 1147-48.
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charge a higher interest rate for credit to compensate them for their lack of
collateral. 242
Although this theory has been criticized on a number of fronts, it was
turned on its head in Professor Lynn LoPucki's article, The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain.243 In this landmark article, LoPucki first argues that few
unsecured creditors actually choose their lot in the debtor's debt scheme. 244
This is not hard to believe. It seems likely that anyone who could get collateral,
would get collateral. 245 In fact, many creditors-including utilities, taxing
authorities, tort claimants, and environmental claimants246-have no intention
of lending money to the debtor. Because Law and Economics relies so heavily
on assumed consent to explain entitlement, when this consent is absent, secured
credit no longer sounds so fair.
242 See id.
243 LoPucki, supra note 183 (challenging the prominent notion that secured credit is
economically efficient). For a detailed and thought-provoking critique of Lopucki's analysis,
see Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REv. 1989
(1994).244 See LoPucld, supra note 183, at 1896. As LoPucki explains, a great deal of
unsecured debt is involuntary, as is the case with tort claims, claims for utilities, and claims
for taxes. See Id. None of these creditors chose to extend credit; rather, they came upon their
creditor status by chance. See id.; see also TEREsA A. SULIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE
OUR DEBTORs: B ANK unc AND CONSUMER CREDrr IN AMEmCA 18, 29 (1989) (referring to
the same concept but calling such creditors "reluctant creditors").
245 See LoPucd, supra note 183, at 1895. Those wishing to explain why someone
would forego collateral claim that transaction costs are higher for secured debt, that unsecured
debt bonds management to the interests of equity holders, and that unsecured creditors are less
vulnerable to loss than their competition and thus lack the incentive to outbid them for secured
credit. See id. As Lopucld establishes, however, none of these explanations make much
sense, and even if they did, they would be inapplicable in the context of unsecured credit. See
id. at 1895-96.
246 Although these obligations can surely be categorized as voluntary short-term loans,
LoPucki calls them "involuntary" or "reluctant" creditors because they are not in the business
of extending credit and did not seek a credit relationship. See id. at 1896. Another way to
explain this terminology would be to view the extension of credit as a result of a utility's
billing system, not as a choice to become a creditor. "Involuntary" may not describe the
status of these creditors as accurately as "creditor without a written agreement regarding
repayment." Id. Whatever we call this form of debt, LoPucki's conclusion is accurate; there
is plenty of this kind of debt in the system. See id. at 1896-97. Moreover, by taking on large
amounts of secured debt, debtors can virtually insulate themselves from these kinds of debt,
for which no recovery will be available. See id. at 1938; see also GRoss, supra note 2, at 13
(discussing involuntary creditors).
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Based upon this lack of consent and the fact that paying tort claims is
necessary to ensure that tortfeasors do not externalize costs attributable to their
operations, Professor LoPucki concludes that involuntary unsecured debt
arising from tort claims should be higher in priority than secured debt.247 After
all, secured creditors chose to deal with the debtor and should thus bear more
responsibility for the risk of nonpayment. 248 If tort claimants had priority over
secured creditors, secured creditors could choose not to lend to the borrower
based on the known risk of nonpayment.249 This is not true when secured
creditors have priority, however, because the involuntary creditor makes no
choice to extend credit and thus cannot decline to do so.250 Thus, the risk of
loss to the economy is greater when the secured creditor has a higher priority
than does the unsecured creditor. 251
LoPucki also suggests that voluntary unsecured debt should take priority
over secured debt because a system that favors secured debt creates far more
secured debt than can actually be paid.252 Unsecured creditors, many of whom
are unsophisticated, end up lending to the debtor regardless of the debtor's debt
situation.253
247 See Lopucki, supra note 183, at 1947. LoPucki reaches this conclusion by finding
flaws in three common justifications for enforcing security interests: (1) everyone has access
to information about the law; (2) a grant of security is tantamount to a conveyance of
property; and (3) secured and unsecured creditors compete in the same market for extensions
of credit. See id. at 1949-58.
248 See id. at 1907.
249 See id. at 1909. A similar idea was discussed in a thoughtful student note discussing
the lack of incentive companies have to avoid asbestos liability when the resulting claims are
general unsecured claims. See Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Tines, 36 STAN. L. REy. 1045, 1059-
68 (1984).
250 See id.; see also Kathryn R. Heidt, leaning up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations
in the Battle for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RurGEs L. REV. 819,
830-51 (1988) (noting that environmental creditors might be entitled to priority ahead of or
payment from secured creditors, because secured creditors could tailor their actions to
respond to such a law, while the environmental creditor can do nothing to eliminate the risk of
loss). This suggestion is sensible given the enormous importance of a clean environment to
the public.
251 See LoPucki, supra note 183, at 1909.
252 See id. at 1932.
253 See id. at 1931. LoPucki also argues that many unsecured creditors already obtain
priority over secured creditors, by extending credit on a short term basis from cash flow.
These creditors are fine as long as the business survives. Otherwise, they cut their losses and
give up. See id.
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LoPucki's analysis, based primarily upon the real, rather than implied,
bargains that creditors make or fail to make, is instructive in considering
noncreditors 254 status in bankruptcy proceedings. Like the involuntary
creditor, many of these parties made no bargain with the debtor.255 The
neighbors of Krupa's did not choose to live near a failing business enterprise
that later became the subject of a "strip joint's" bid. And though both the
healthcare recipients and the employees did choose to do business with the
debtor, they probably had very little real bargaining power. Unlike Article 9 in
the context of secured credit,256 there are no information systems to assist an
employee or the recipient of healthcare benefits in assessing such a company's
financial condition or deciding what form of bargain to make. In essence, there
is no real bargain.
LoPucki argues that some creditors with unsecured claims are entitled to
priority over some creditors with secured claims, because the assumptions we
make about secured credit are false.257 Although his suggestions are radical in
and of themselves, he is suggesting a restructuring of priorities among existing
claims.258 Creating property rights in those who do not possess "claims" 259
under existing bankruptcy law is a still larger step. I am not suggesting that
compensating people for nonpecuniary rights in bankruptcy is the next logical
step arising from Professor LoPucki's analysis. Instead, I argue that, just as we
can extend or reverse our historically-conceived priority system, we can extend
our historically-conceived view of what constitutes a "claim." We can redefine
"claim" through future expectations, such as an expectation of future
employment or an expectation that toxic waste dumps not be abandoned.
I am certainly not, through this analysis, suggesting that noncreditor
interests obtain priority over secured creditor interests. I am merely suggesting
254 In this context, "noncreditor" means a creditor holding a nonpecuniary claim, such
as those described in this Article, that does not rise to the level of a cognizable bankruptcy
"claim" under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994) (defining a "claim" as a
"present right to payment").
255 This idea, that unsecured creditors made no real bargain with the debtor, may seem
somewhat inconsistent with the notion that workers might have a property right in an
enterprise in which they work. Singer's proposals, however, are based on property rights
arising out of service and not through contractual relations. See Singer, supra note 209, at
621-23.
256 See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9-102 to 9-507 (West 1997) (providing a uniform
notice system for which of a debtor's assets is encumbered by security interests).
257 See LoPucki, supra note 183, at 1947-63.
258 See id. at 1963-64.
259 See 11 U.S.C § 101(5) (1994).
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that the bankruptcy concept of "claim" is malleable. The fact that we do not
compensate for these interests now does not mean they should never be subject
to compensation. The two primary arguments supporting LoPucki's argument
subordinating secured creditor claims also support some compensation to or
weighing of these interests, first because the holders of these interests made no
bargain, and second because we should do what we can to prevent businesses
from externalizing costs attributable to their operation, including the cost of
labor.
Professor Kathryn Heidt has suggested an expansion of the definition of
"claim" in her analysis of environmental obligations. Noting that it is often
unclear whether some obligations, such as clean-up orders, qualify as claims at
all,260 Heidt argues that we should redefine our concept of "claim" to ensure
that public health and welfare is preserved.261 This is one example of an area,
she argues, in which long-term societal goals must take precedence over short-
term economic goals.262
Concluding that any entity that continues to pollute must not receive a
bankruptcy discharge of its obligations to clean up,263 Heidt argues that
internalization of environmental costs would be maximized if recovery were
allowed in bankruptcy cases not just for actual injury but also for increased risk
260 See Heidt, supra note 25, at 1071-75.
261 See id. at 1075 (noting that due to the confusion between what constitutes a claim
and, thus, what obligations can be treated in a reorganization plan and then discharged-as
opposed to paid in full postbankruptcy-litigants like the EPA often settle a big case rather
than risk loss). This phenomenon could cause severe harm to the public if the settlement is not
as favorable as a court's ruling would be. See id. The public is harmed by environmental
damage that is not remediated and by additional taxes that may be needed to clean up sites that
the users fail to My remediate. See id.
262 At first glance, many people thought that predictors of environmental disaster were
over-reactive and out of touch with reality. Sadly, the opposite has proven true. We have done
far more permanent damage to the environment than anyone ever predicted. See, e.g.,
MIcHAEL B. Gm.RARD, WHOsE BACKYARD, WHOSE RisK: FEAR AND FAmNEss iN ToXIc
AND NucLEAR WASE SrrNG 11-12 (1994) (discussing the travesties of the Love Canal and
abandoned pesticide plants in Arkansas which contain DDT, Agent Orange, and dioxin-
contaminated waste); L.R. JONES & JoHN H. BALDWIN, CoRPoRATE ENVRONMmENTAL
PoucY AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 141-42 (1994) (stating that toxic chemicals are
found in the bodies of most if not all Americans, including chemicals that cause cancer, birth
defects, and other health problems, and that there has been a 12,500% increase in the
production of chemicals from 1940-1987); Denis Smith, The Frankenstein Syndrome:
Corporate Responsibility and the Environment, in BusiNss AND THE ENviRONMEr: THE
IMPICATIONS OF TnE NEw ENvIRONMENTAIsM 172 (Denis Smith ed. 1993) (discussing who
ultimately paid the price for Seveso, B'hopal, and Exxon Valdez).
263 See Heidt, supra note 25, at 1078.
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of injury due to environmental harm.264 Victims could be compensated for this
increased risk without proving that they had a current right to be paid. Funds to
pay for such risks could be contributed to a fund, on an ongoing basis, so that
money would be available to compensate whatever harms arise. 265
Heidt also suggests that we expand the definition of claim to include all
equitable and legal obligations, not just those that are due in present dollars. 266
Currently, an obligation that is purely equitable is one for which money cannot
presently be substituted. 267 This necessarily pushes the obligation outside the
definition of "claim." For example, in some states, rights to specific
performance cannot be reduced to a claim. 268 Yet these entitlements may be
worthy of treatment in a case, regardless of whether they fit within our current
definition of claim. As Professor Heidt has suggested:
The very concept of debt or obligation in bankruptcy can be expanded or
contracted to bring in or leave out different obligations. We could even expand
the concept so far as to include the interests of employees or the local
community or others who do not currently have an official voice in
bankruptcy.2 69
264 See id. at 1080. Other suggestions for internalizing these costs include charging
shareholders for clean-up costs and giving environmental creditors secured status both inside
and outside of bankruptcy, see id. at 1079-86, the latter idea to give analogous taxes higher
priority than voluntary secured debt. The incentive to internalize seems to work. Banks
regularly monitor a debtor's tax payments to avoid losing priority to tax liens.
265 See id. at 1081.
266 See id. at 1082-83.
267 See id.
268 See id. at 1083. Unlike persons with a nonpecuniary interest as discussed in this
Article, persons with a right to specific performance receive full performance rather than
nothing at all. This is why Professor Heidt claims that retaining this distinction causes
inequality among similarly situated stakeholders. Full performance occurs because equitable
rights are legally cognizable rights, whereas many of the rights I have been discussing are not.
The specific performance example does, however, demonstrate the considerable flexibility we
have in defining a claim.
269 Id. at 1055. Professor Heidt may not approve of this particular use of her quote. In
the same article, she specifically states that the "lost jobs" arguments have few who
recommend them and that such arguments may be short-sighted. See id. at 1092. The extent
to which this is true depends upon what is done about these lost jobs. Even I am not
suggesting that these concerns take precedence over all other issues. I merely believe, as
discussed supra in Part mH.B.3.b, that employees should have a right to be heard on issues of
future employment.
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In other words, the concept of claim is flexible and subject to change.
Expanding the notion of claim, in order to compensate nonpecuniary claims or
balance these interests against current economic claims, is one way to address
the rights of those with no current voice in bankruptcy proceedings.
2. Estimation for Speaking Purposes Only:
A Voice Without Payment
If the task of quantifying and then compensating nonpecuniary rights by
redefining property rights or claims is too drastic, less drastic solutions also are
available. Undoubtedly, some nonpecuniary interests are actually more valuable
to society than economic ones. Environmental issues and other matters
involving public safety provide examples. 270 The bankruptcy system addresses
issues like these primarily through its priority system.271 Some interests,
however, fall through the cracks. 272
One could imagine a system in which nonpecuniary interests could be
translated into dollar values for the purposes of determining which interests
were greater. A similar approach is used in estimating claims for the purposes
of Chapter 11 plan voting.273 Claims that are contingent or unliquidated are
often estimated for the purpose of either ultimate allowance and payment, or for
the purpose of voting on confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.274 Estimation
procedures were included in the Code in order to fix the debtor's liability for
contingent or unliquidated claims and, thus, to ensure that all legal obligations
of the debtor would be converted into dollar amounts.275 The particular
estimation method is left almost entirely up to the judge,276 and can employ
270 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1994) (excepting actions involving the enforcement
of the government's police power from the automatic stay); Heidt, supra note 250, at 832-35
(arguing that it is necessary for economic and societal reasons, that environment claims
receive priority).
271 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507 (1994).
272 See supra notes 146-82 and accompanying text.
273 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (c) (1994).
274 See David R. Weinstein et al., Estimation of Claims: Precedential Effects of Court's
Estimation, 15 AM. BANKR. INsr. J. 12, 12-13 (1996).
275 See In re Evans Products, Co., 60 B.R. 863, 866 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)
(discussing the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 502 (c) (1994)).
276 See David Kauffinan, Note, Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated
Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153, 168-73 (1982); Neil Wyland, Toward
Protection of Creditors and Estimated Claims in Cram Down: How Indubitable Should the
Equivalence Be, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1389, 1416-17 (1995).
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statistical evidence, studies from other disciplines, or a host of other flexible
means. 277 In that sense, claim estimation is an ideal model upon which to base
some method of converting interests that are not currently measured in dollars
into dollar values.278 Estimations of nonpecuniary claims could even be used
for plan voting purposes only, meaning that the holders of these nonpecuniary
claims could receive a voice in the estimated amount, but would not necessarily
be compensated or credited based upon the estimated amount. 279
There admittedly is a conceptual difference between estimating an
economic claim that has not yet been quantified and estimating a nonpecuniary
claim. How would one value the potential deterioration of a neighborhood in
dollars? How would one estimate the value of future employment, which is by
no means certain, over a period of years? The estimation of future tort claims
may provide guidance for estimating claims that are economic but not presently
due,280 but as for claims that are not traditionally considered pecuniary, we are
still attempting to compare apples and oranges on some levels.
Our current legal system provides few mechanisms for making such a
calculation measurable or meaningful. Both Judge Schermer and Professor
277 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 720 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
various § 502(c) estimation methodologies used in the Johns-Manville case).
278 While the notion of estimation is quite flexible, it is usually used to estimate
unliquidated, unsecured claums like tort claims currently being litigated. See In re A.H.
Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 720. One scholar, however, has suggested that estimation procedures
be used to determine the value of a secured creditor's collateral, to determine the indubitable
equivalent in a cramdown context. See Neil P. Olack, The Asset Payment Plan: Satisfying the
Indubitable Equivalent Requirement, 10 MIss. C.L. Rnv. 21, 37-38 (1989). But see Wyland,
supra note 276, at 1420-21.
279 Under the current estimation statute, debtors must estimate claims whenever the full
liquidation of the claim would unduly delay administration of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 502
(c) (1994). The procedure is commonly used in mass tort cases to value claims that are far too
munerous to value through a full-scale adversary proceeding. See Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Jobns-Manville), 843 F.2d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re A.H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d at 720 (noting that the Manville court estimated the asbestos claim using
statistical means, epidemiological studies, and data from claims previously filed against
Manville); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 262 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding
future asbestos claims within Bankruptcy Code definition of "claims" and thus subject to
estimation); In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540, 542
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing procedures for appointing "neutral independent experts" to
estimate claims in Johns-Manville bankruptcy).
280 See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1041 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
estimation of future tort claims); In re UNR, 71 B.R. 467, 471 (Bankr. N.D. IMl. 1987)
(reserving a determination of whether the holders of future asbestos claims are creditors under
the Bankruptcy Code).
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Gross have claimed that many of the noncreditor interests affected by
bankruptcy cannot be quantified.281 I am not convinced.282 Consider the
enormous number of nonpecuniary interests that juries quantify every day. One
surely could use economists to measure the future employment rights and
appraisers to measure deterioration of the neighborhood. Whether nonpecuniary
claims are measured for distribution and balancing purposes, as was discussed
in the prior subsection, or merely for the purpose of plan voting, some
quantification may be required and would be difficult, but not impossible, to
achieve.
The purpose of this estimation discussion is to begin a discourse about the
ways such measurements could be made. To start the process of considering the
proper treatment of these interests, the estimation process used to estimate
claims in Chapter 11 may be a useful preliminary model.
281 See GROSS, supra note 31, at 1039; Schermer, supra note 32, at 1049.
282 As Professor Warren has noted:
[W]hile the broader effects of business failure can be elusive to measure, they are
nonetheless very real. Congress-whether out of a crass concern about reelection or a
superior view of the deeper social implications of business failure in a highly integrated
society-accepted the idea that bankruptcy serves to protect interests that have no other
protection. The older employee, the regular customer, the dependent supplier, and the
local community are important; and bankruptcy attends to many of their concerns,
regardless of whether they have rights recognized at state law.
Warren, supra note 27, at 788. On the issue of how to measure "social wealth," which he
defines as all things of value, not just tangible things, Professor D. Bruce Johnsen noted:
As we all know, my right to bum garbage in my backyard conflicts with my neighbor's
right to breathe smoke-free air. Consequently, the judiciary will eventually face the
question of which mutually exclusive set of expectations over scarce goods maximizes
social wealth. To answer this question the judiciary must, if only explicitly, measure
social wealth in alternative states of the world. Our ability to measure wealth empirically
in terms of dollars or dollar equivalents is limited and therefore provides us with limited
solace; only rarely do cases lend themselves to such precise measurement. The best we
can hope for is that some subset of the relevant values can be measured in dollars or
dollar equivalents, thereby leaving a smaller and more manageable set of immeasurable
values to the rumination of the presiding judge.
D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STU.. 263, 284-85 (1986).
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3. Providing a Voice as a Goal in and of Itself
Some would claim that even estimating these nonpecuniary rights may be
too great a burden on the current bankruptcy system. Perhaps just hearing the
concerns of parties without current claims could provide a benefit in and of
itself. At the moment, we have no idea what the impact on such interests has
been. As a scholar from the emerging Law and Narrative movement recently
noted:
Since all decisionmakers are inevitably situated somewhere, decisions reached
without attention to the experiences of those subjected to them will reflect the
unacknowledged partiality of those reaching them. The choice is not between
"fact" and "fiction," or between "objectivity" and "subjectivity." Someone's
story will emerge in legal decisions; the only question is whose.283
Absent changes in our bankruptcy system, the unexpressed interests of
parties holding nonpecuniary interests will never emerge or be heard.284
Recognizing that not all interests are expressed in our judicial system, authors
in the Law and Narrative movement claim that the mere act of telling an
otherwise untold story affects how law is made and applied. 285 Although the
283 See Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RuTGERs L.J. 79,
85 (1991) (reviewing NARRAnvE AND TmE LEGAL DiscoursE: A READER IN STORYrELLNG
AND TmE LAw (David R. Papke ed. 1991)) [hereinafter NARRATNE AND L AL DiscounsE].
There is, of course, no guarantee that merely allowing these interests to be expressed will
actually further the interests of those expressing them. It may or may not. Without being
expressed, however, we can be sure that no possible solution to this problem will be reached
or even discussed.
284 See supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
285 See Baron, supra note 283, at 82-85. The notion is that the content of the story, and
the act of telling it, will bring factors to bear that were hidden, and thus reconstruct or change
results. As Professor Richard Delgado describes:
Most who write about storytelling focus on its community-building functions:
stories build consensus, a common culture of shared understandings, and deeper, more
vital ethics. Counterstories, which challenge the received wisdom, do that as well. They
can open new windows into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life other
than the ones we live. They enrich imagination and teach that by combining elements
from the story and current reality, we may construct a new world richer than either
alone. Counterstories can quicken and engage conscience. Their graphic quality can stir
imagination in ways in which more conventional discourse cannot.
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MIcH.
L. REV. 2411, 2414-15 (1989).
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precise form of this effect is not always clear, this new legal discourse finds
benefit in the fact that untold stories are ultimately told.286 Although it may
seem odd to discuss such an esoteric and theoretical concept in bankruptcy
scholarship, this emerging legal discipline provides insight into the implications
of a narrow approach to standing. 287 Even outside the Law and Narrative
movement, scholars have long recognized that in a highly legalized society like
ours, individual freedom and autonomy is often dependent upon access to the
law, access which is often denied to certain persons or groups.288
Some stories are never permitted to be told because of inequalities in the
legal system and society as a whole.289 Some interests are marginalized and
286 See E. Elizabeth Dallam, The Growing Voice of Indigenous Peoples: Their Use of
Storytelling and Rights Discourse to Transform Multilateral Development Bank Policies, 8
Amiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 121-27 (1991) (discussing how narrative discourse by
marginalized groups may be a "powerful tool for transforming legal thinking"); William M.
O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Verses Legal Adequacy in Small Claims
Court Narratives, in NARRATwVE AND LEGAL DiscouRs,, supra note 283, at 65, 76-88
(describing the difference between the legal adequacy of the stories told and the actual impact
of such stories, and finding great value in the stories, but refusing to conclude that they had an
impact on the outcome of cases in small claims court). But see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School. An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807,
824-27 (1993) (doubting that any real impact occurs as a result of storytelling).
287 This Article is not the first to use Law and Narrative concepts to support bankruptcy
scholarship. In his symposium article defending Chapter 11 against its critics, Professor
William C. Whitford used storytelling to explain the misconceptions of Chapter 11. See
William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1385-92
(1994). Law and Narrative has also been used in the highly conservative and formalistic field
of corporate law. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009 (1992) (using Law and Narrative theory to explain how
corporate law is applied); see also GRoss, supra note 2, at 131.
288 See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, cited in Rapoport, supra note 2, at
800 n.62.
2 89 The core of the Law and Narrative movement is the notion that stories told by
oppressed persons or interests have special significance. Some even claim that the power of
communicating these stories can transform the law by changing the consciousness of more
influential members of society who will in turn change the letter of the law. See Delgado,
supra note 285, at 2435-37 (discussing African American, Mexican American, and Native
American traditions of storytelling). But see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Erpression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1259 (1992) (questioning whether free expression will ever
actually result in societal or legal changes).
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silenced by systemic legal procedures and societal biases. 290 Nonpecuniary
interests have been marginalized and silenced in a similar, but more profound,
way by current bankruptcy practices.291 Like strict evidentiary rules that limit
the extent with which certain interests are heard, limiting bankruptcy court
standing silences these interests.292 With limited bankruptcy court standing,
however, the silence is complete. No story is told at all.
If, as narrative theory scholars claim, letting stories be told is beneficial,
what can we accomplish through storytelling? Put another way, can storytelling
be a solution to problems addressed in this Article, namely that the voices of
nonpecuniary interests are not being heard in large Chapter 11 cases that are
affecting society as a whole?
To ask storytelling to address all of the problems raised by this Article
would be to ask too much. Law and Narrative theory does provide some
assistance, however. A central tenet of Law and Narrative is that traditional
legal jurisprudence, which is deeply rule-centered and positivistic, has failed to
respond to the uniquely human element of society.293 Technical legal analysis is
seen as too sterile and abstract to respond to human beings, without whom we
would not need a legal system.294 Legal problems are essentially human
problems, and lawyers, judges, and even people who run and advise large
corporations must draw upon both human and legal skills to solve legal
290 See Dallam, supra note 286, at 131 (noting that the use of both narrative and rights
discourse by historically marginalized groups function as a shared vocability and helps groups
bind together and organize against oppressive laws); see also Rhonda V. Magee, The
Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in
Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REv. 863, 865 (1993) (stating that
narrative is "an excellent methodological tool and an antihegemonic analytical device"); Gary
Minda, One Hundred Years of Modem Legal Thought From Langdell and Holmes to Posner
and Schlag, 28 Rn. L. REv. 353, 355-56 (1994) (stating that narratives from traditionally
marginalized cultures can make society more responsible to the needs of "a multicultural
world").
2 91 See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
292 The idea of sitting around and talking just for the sake of talking has not been exactly
well-accepted in the bankruptcy context. Professor James Bowers has accused Professor
Donald Korobkin as prescribing this method in bankruptcy proceedings and feels certain that
creditors gain precious little from the approach. See Bowers, supra note 16, at 72-76. I agree
with Koroblin and find "talking" beneficial for the reasons discussed in this subsection.
293 See Baron, supra note 283, at 93-94; Rapoport, supra note 2, at 798-801.
2 94 See Baron, supra note 283, at 94-97.
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problems.295 Thus, a limited view of standing can produce the same result in
another context: a bankruptcy system that is not responsive to the human beings
for whom it was designed.
Even modem economists have acknowledged that ignoring the "human
element" can have grave consequences. 296 At the very least, then, if hearing
these otherwise silenced voices will facilitate consideration of the human side of
legal issues, there ought to be a resulting benefit to the human condition.
Allowing noneconomic interests to be expressed will also educate us about
these interests. 297 At the very least, we can determine what interests are being
affected and how, and, if appropriate, determine what can and should be done
to further these interests. Knowledge of the condition of these interests is itself
very valuable in determining future bankruptcy policy. In fact, until we know
exactly how these outside interests are being affected, it may be dangerous to
ignore them.
4. Considering Noneconomic Interests as Junior Interests
Assuming that just listening to noneconomic interests is not enough, and
that paying a distribution298 for or providing economic credit for such claims
may be more than the system can accomplish at this time, what other
consideration could these interests receive? While Joseph Singer urges a shift in
the property paradigm, 299 he also espouses a far less radical principle based on
295 See id.; see also GRoss, supra note 2, at 102; see generally Rapoport, supra note 2
(discussing the unique role attorneys can play in assisting clients to attend to the human
element of law).
296 WOLMAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60, at 66. Michael Hammer's and James
Champy's book, REENGnmENG THE CoRpoRAnON (1994), has been used as a "handbook"
for downsizing companies. The book proposed massive, quick layoffs of huge numbers of
workers. See HAMMER & CnAMPY, supra, cited in WOLmAN & COLAMOSCA, supra note 60,
at 66. After thousands of workers were laid off from numerous companies, based on the
advice in the book, Hammer acknowledged that he erred in not considering the human side of
the issue. See id. at 68. He stated that the idea is no longer "so much getting rid of people.
It's now getting more out of people. I wasn't smart enough about that. I was reflecting my
engineering background and was insufficiently appreciative of the human dimension. I've
since learned that's critical." Id.
297 We are painfully uninformed about how large bankruptcy cases have impacted the
rights of noncreditor interest. Having provided no place at which such information can be
gleaned, we are in no position to draw conclusions about the potential effects or lack thereof.
298 See supra note 224.
299 Singer, however, bases his reliance interest on current property doctrines:
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the golden rule. 3°° Specifically, Singer suggests that one should not be
permitted to leave a community in waste if there is another viable option.301
This principle translates into a very simple, logical, and persuasive method of
considering nonpecuniary rights in bankruptcy. One might simply consider
these interests to be junior to existing economic interests, but still important. It
may be possible to address these nonpecuniary interests without negatively
affecting current economic claims in the case. In essence, the court would
consider the apples first, and then consider the oranges. 302
This approach would be better than simply allowing nonpecuniary interests
to be heard. It also would provide further support for the idea that these
interests should be expressed and explored. It would be improper to
inadvertently and unnecessarily hurt these interests, simply because we do not
know what they are.
Admittedly, this approach is unlikely to be entirely effective in protecting
noneconomic interests. Because economic interests would be paramount, it
They include, for example, the rules about adverse possession, prescriptive easements,
public rights of access to private property, tenants' rights, equitable division of property
on divorce, [and] welfare ights ..... The legal system requires this shift, not because of
reliance on specific promises, but because the parties have relied on each other generally
and on the continuation of their relationship. Moreover, the more vulnerable party may
need access to resources controlled by the more powerful party, and the relationship is
such that we consider it fair to place this burden on the more powerful party by
redistributing entitlements.
Singer, supra note 209, at 622-23. Singer suggests a reliance interest in property as a
counterbalance to the notion of free alienability. While tort concepts like strict liability and
contract concepts like good faith and unconscionability help maintain a balance between
individual and public interests, property law has been very underprotective of community
interest. See id. at 636.
300 As Singer states:
"We must combine our concern for associational freedom with our concern for
preventing abuses of power by the haves against the have-nots. We can approach this
dual goal by asking: What preconditions are necessary for healthy social relationships to
develop? Those preconditions are defined by the ends society should have; they embody
the form of social life we hope to create."
Id. at 751.
301 See id. at 719-20.
302 A similar construct already is used in bankruptcy cases, when considering the rights
of equity holders to receive a distribution from the estate. See Lopucki & Whitford, supra
note 66, at 680-83.
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would be easy to find an existing economic interest that could be affected to
some small degree by a concession to nonpecuniary interests. This could lead to
mere lip service to nonpecuniary interests, without real consideration of them.
On the other hand, this approach is preferable to failing to hear and
consider nonpecuniary interests at all. Judges who already consider
nonpecuniary interests probably already use this golden rule approach. 30 3
Moreover, if listening to these nonpecuniary interests was more common, more
judges would consciously protect nonpecuniary interests at least to this extent. It
is hard to imagine any argument against providing at least this much protection
to societal interests. While some might argue that hearing these extra voices will
take up valuable court time-thus creating inefficiency-as long as efficiency is
measured accurately, hearing these additional voices will create, rather than
impair, efficiency.
D. Achieving True Efficiency
In some ways, Law and Economics has given efficiency a bad name. Cruel
and devoid of humanity, many Law and Economics models just do not measure
the right things. Economics itself, however, is a different story. Economics
recognizes happiness as a benefit and sorrow as a cost.304 In that sense, the
303 See In re Financial News Network, Inc., 980 F.2d 165, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that sometimes the highest offer for assets is not the best, making it possible to
take considerations other than price into account when approving a sale of assets); In re After
Six, Inc., 154 B.R. 876, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (same).
304 See Bowers, supra note 16, at 71. Professor Bowers claims that:
Economics is concerned with human behavior in the production and allocation of what
economists call "goods." Goods are not limited to corporeal movables, which is how
lawyers employ that term. Economists use "goods" in its broadest, most literal sense to
mean any state of affairs that people think is good: that they actually value to the extent
that fpeople] will expend some other resource to obtain it. Nothing inherent in economic
analysis forecloses consideration of (or even necessarily slights) moral, aesthetic,
romantic, or even spiritual values. In that sense, there are few, if any, noneconomic
values. 'There are only values that really motivate people and those that do not.
Id.; see also Johnsen, supra note 282, at 268-69 (noting that an "economic good
is... anything of which more is preferred to less" and that "all valued things are scarce")
(citations omitted). Naturally enough, when the residents of San Gobin begin living on the
streets of Philadelphia, without their life support to boot, their demise will be a cost. Only the
truly cold-hearted would sees this as a benefit, because the residents would not need support-
financial or otherwise-after death. For an interesting discussion on how one goes about
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very idea of recognizing "noneconomic" interests in bankruptcy is
misplaced.305 All interests are economic in the sense that if they are not dealt
with properly, unfavorable economic conditions ultimately will result. The
residents of a structured continuing care facility will become wards of the state,
children in a deteriorating neighborhood will tax the criminal justice system,
and displaced workers will collect unemployment and social security. Family
and social support systems will break down, all at a great cost. These are real
costs that can be measured in real dollars.
Economics itself, unlike Law and Economics, also recognizes that
economic efficiency can only be accurately measured over time. Short-term
profits are not economically significant.306 And, as noted in Part II.C of this
Article, some economic and human conditions are not sustainable. 307 These
conditions, no matter how profitable in the immediate future, must be
avoided. 308 This is not sociology, but economics.
If we care about economic efficiency because it somehow pertains to the
human condition, we cannot possibly measure it based on short-term corporate
profits alone. As the sole measurement, this indicator will consistently require
that corporations lay off as many workers as possible, pay few benefits, pollute
the earth to the extent legally permitted, engage in no corporate giving, and sell
valuing human life, see ST==n E. RHOADS, VALUING LiFE: PuBLIc PoucY Dna MAS
(1980).
305 Bowers, supra note 16, at 72.
306 Large scale efficiencies, such as those reflected in high overall corporate profits, are
too decentralized and too abstract to be of any benefit to most people. See SCHUMACER,
supra note 183, at 59-70.
307 See KotRA GINTHER Er AL., SusrAINABrL DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD
GovERNANCE 365 (1995) (arguing that sustainable development is incompatible with
unlimited economic growth).
308 See SCHUMACHER, supra note 183, at 59; see also KORTEN, supra note 202, at 207-
26 (describing how corporate cannibalism and mass layoffs make money but threaten to make
human beings obsolete). On the other hand, good health and job satisfaction cost less than
their alternatives. See id. While Schumacher was certainly an unconventional economist in
proposing that the human condition is relevant in determining what is important as an
economist, he is not alone. For examples of other economists holding similar views, see H.
DALY & J. COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: RED]RECING THE ECONOMY TowARD
COMMUNITY, THE ENvIRONMENT, AND A SusTAINABLE FUrTRE (1989); E. MISHAN,
INTRODUCTION TO NORMATnvE ECONOMICs (1981); ECONOMICs, ECOLOGY, ETmcs: ESSAYS
TOWARD A STH-ADY STATE ECONOMY (H. Daly ed. 1980). One primary way to improve
sustainability is to rely more heavily on labor than tangible goods, as labor is unquestionably a
sustainable resource. See KORTE, supra note 202, at 240-41 (noting that corporations are
investing in more and more machines, at the complete expense of human capital).
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off existing assets for short-term profits. 309 Corporate raiders who espouse this
"pure" economic philosophy have been literally "feeding off" of socially
responsible companies, arguing that taking them over is beneficial to America
because the lower short-term profits, resulting from their decent business
behavior, prove that they are inefficient.310 Even top managers in this corporate
takeover environment know their jobs are not safe, because they are only too
familiar with this philosophy.31' Taken to its logical conclusion-and not even
so outlandishly different from current reality-this form of economic efficiency
could eliminate all access to a decent livelihood:
Perhaps one day, if allowed sufficient freedom to follow its own unrestrained
tendencies, a global corporation will achieve the ultimate in productive
efficiency, an entity made up solely of computers and machines busily engaged
in the replication of money. We might call it the perfectly efficient corporation.
Although this is surely not what anyone intends, we are acting as though this is
the world we seek to create.312
If creating piles of green bills, or electronic equivalents, is the goal in
measuring economic efficiency, then short-term corporate profit maximization
is the sole indicator. If we are concerned about people, on the other hand, we
need to use a different measure of efficiency.
If we are concerned about people, efficiency should be measured not by
solely counting dollars present today, but by deciding what is important to
people and valuing the presence or absence of those things. 313 Dollars might be
included in the category of important things, but, as we have just seen, by
themselves they do not create value.314 When Professor Bruce Johnsen
proclaims that "wealth is value," he is not talking about monetary wealth alone,
but rather about all things, including intangible things, that we prefer over
309 See KORTEN, supra note 202, at 214-40.
310 See id. at 207-13.
311 See id. at 244. Business Week calls the 1990s the age of the "dnpies," the
downwardly mobile professionals. Downwards Mobility, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1992, at 57-
58.
312 KORTEN, supra note 202, at 241-42.
313 See Johnsen, supra note 282, at 268-69; see also GRoss, supra note 2, at 208-09
(discussing study finding that small farm communities had a higher quality of life than
agribusiness towns and that, as a result, the small communities were more efficient on one
level).
3 14 See Johnsen, supra note 282, at 268.
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others. 315 Among the beneficial things recognized as valuable to economists are
life, meaningful employment, health, clean air, safe schools, self-
improvement,316 and virtually anything else that motivates people. 317 One need
only consider the cost a childless couple will endure in order to have or acquire
a child, and one sees the dollar's failure to equate with all that is valuable. Can
these noneconomic things be measured? Of course they can, and if they are to
have any meaning in the bankruptcy context, they must.
318
There also is a difference between the goals of maximizing values to
creditors and minimizing losses to the various parts of society. Many Law and
Economics scholars insist that the sole purpose of Chapter 11 is to maximize
values to creditors. 319 Other scholars believe the purpose is to minimize loss
resulting from business failure. 320 The difference between the two, in terms of
315 See id.
316 See Hal Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y 50, 62-64
(1995). Professor Cooter attempts to explain benevolent behavior in economic terms. See id.
This behavior is often explained as a result of the fact that human beings are complex
organisms with many facets and that competitive behavior is but one form of human response.
Professor Gross, for example, believes that human beings are basically good. See GROSS,
supra note 2, at 6-7. I would like to agree but do not want to premise my entire argument on
this assumption because I am not completely sure. I am hopeful but not always optimistic.
Ultimately, this does not affect my analysis because I think that benevolent behavior is often
efficient. See GRoss, supra note 2, at 102 (explaining that humanitarian grounds may translate
into economic benefit). See KORTEN, supra note 202, at 241-42.
Moreover, people do things for more than one reason. After my friend Peter and I had
lunch in a cafeteria-style restaurant, he suggested we clean up our trash even though it was
not required. I agree but for a different reason. He altruistically wanted to save the employees
a trip. I thought it would be more efficient for me to bring down the tray, rather than make
someone make two trips, one toward the tray and the other away. The point is that one could
engage in the same behavior for both reasons.
3 17 See Bowers, supra note 16, at 72.
318 Many scholars might disagree and say that we can use a strictly moral or normative
approach in making bankruptcy decisions, without regard to cost-benefit analysis. Franz
Schumacher certainly thought that forcing noneconomic values into a cost-benefit analysis
reduced these important things to a lowest common denominator. See SCHuMAClER, supra
note 183, at 41-42. I am not so sure. I understand that measuring certain things seems
unsavory, but I see no alternative. Dollars are the accepted measure of the bankruptcy forum
and attempting to introduce a new measurement is likely to slow down the acceptance of new
types of interests into the process. To my mind, a cost-benefit approach is better than no
approach at all.
3 19 See supra note 1.
320 See Warren, supra note 27, at 788; Bowers, supra note 27, at 2143; Heidt, supra
note 25, at 1078.
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bankruptcy policy, is monumental, despite the fact that economically one would
think the two would be equal. They are not the same because the benefits and
losses are not always experienced by the same persons. The potential benefits
are available to creditors only, while the losses are experienced over an
enormous spectrum of society.
I see no reason to choose, as both are economically significant. Paying full
attention to one of these goals while ignoring the other cannot be efficient. Both
must be considered if efficiency is a goal. Otherwise, we simply redistribute
losses without admitting that we are doing so. If we take the high bid over the
lower one in the Fancy Pants example, we redistribute the losses to the
workers. Similarly, we automatically distribute losses on the San Gobin
residents if we do not consider their interests. Moreover, unless we measure
and balance their losses when considering the overall economics of the
situation, our decisions in bankruptcy cases may not be economically efficient.
Thus, in my view, both long-term overall losses, as well as returns to creditors,
must be considered in determining what is economically efficient.
Having said that, efficiency in the bankruptcy process itself is still
necessary. Hearing all these additional parties will add administrative costs to
cases and thus make reorganization more difficult and expensive. 321 In order to
provide the maximum benefit to parties with no present economic interest to
assert, there must be some limit on the extent to which noneconomic interests
may be heard. Otherwise, nothing will ever be accomplished.
To address this concern, I propose two limitations on the situations in
which the nontraditional claims discussed in this Article should be heard. First,
based upon the standard used in other federal courts to establish standing, an
interest must be substantial in order to be heard, but it need not be
pecuniary. 322 If this standard works in other federal courts, it can work in the
bankruptcy context as well. 323 Second, nonpecuniary interests initially should
be heard only in major events in a case, in which their substantial interests are
affected. Initially, I propose that such interests be permitted expression in three
32 1 See Bowers, supra note 16, at 73-74 (stating that talk is not necessarily cheap and
someone must pay for it). While Professor Bowers argues that talk itself is a worthless
remedy because it does not in itself create any real benefits, we do not know if this is the case
because we have not heard what these voices have to say. See id.
322 See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997). Under this test, a litigant must
have "a personal stake in the alleged dispute," and suffer a potential injury particularized as to
him. See id. The stake need not be pecuniary.
323 Under this approach, no particular groups-with exception of labor which should be
treated differently-gets automatic standing. Rather, standing should be decided on a case-by-
case basis, based upon the substantiality of interest test.
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contexts only: plan confirmation, the sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's
assets, and the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease.324 These
pivotal events change the entire course of a case, particularly in the context of
plan confirmation or an asset sale.
With these limitations, adding more parties to the bankruptcy bargaining
table should not cause a significant increase in the cost of rehabilitation.
Substantial nonpecuniary interests could only be heard on pivotal issues in a
case, thus preserving the lion's share of the proceeding for traditional
bankruptcy parties. 325
Whatever costs result from this limited right, granted in limited contexts,
are certainly justified by the benefits created. This is particularly true given that
we may have no right to ignore certain of these interests, regardless of costs.
Limiting bankruptcy court standing to pecuniary rights does not appear to be
justified by prudential or other concerns. As a result, it would be better to adopt
a limited expansion of standing now, in order to preclude the involuntary
imposition of a broader standard later. In summary, hearing nonpecuniary
interests in bankruptcy does cost money. These costs are unavoidable,
however. We can pay now through responsive legal and social systems or pay
later through unresponsive ones that create other forms of economic and social
waste.
IV. CONCLUSION
We are living in credit-filled times, in which bankruptcy is not
uncommon.326 More generally, these are times of massive economic
restructuring and substantial financial loss. We have always known that losses
like these are experienced broadly, by many segments of society. As more
restructuring occurs, however, substantial losses become more common,
particularly in geographic areas that lose entire industries to financial failure.
One of the purposes of bankruptcy law is to minimize, to the extent
possible, the effects of these losses. How this is best accomplished varies
depending on the type of loss experienced. Traditionally, bankruptcy
proceedings have adjudicated the rights of the debtor vis-A-vis creditors, but not
3 24 The right to appeal an unfavorable decision also must be provided. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2018 (failing to provide such an appeal to labor objecting to a Chapter 11 plan).
325 For added flexibility, the court could grant this right to be heard in other contexts for
"cause." Perhaps this could be added to the Bankruptcy Code after we see how this proposed
solution works.
326 See GRoss, supra note 2, at 6.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
many other parts of society. This approach may no longer be acceptable, given
the number of persons affected by bankruptcy cases.
One of the most difficult questions is how best to determine what interests
to hear. We cannot open a Pandora's Box and hear the positions of all persons
affected by a case, regardless of how tangential. Nor can we entirely ignore
these interests, some of which are truly substantial. Many courts have in the
past provided bankruptcy court standing only to persons with current pecuniary
interests in the debtor. Statutory law does not impose this limitation, however,
and there is no other justification for it. Both courts and Chapter 11 debtors
themselves have an obligation to consider the rights of affected third parties
when making important decisions. The only question is which interests to
consider.
The task is to apply a rule of standing that allows parties to articulate
substantial interests in bankruptcy cases, even if those interests are not
pecuniary, but that also limits the contexts in which these interests can be
asserted. This is not an impossible task. The standing standard utilized in other
federal courts is applicable in bankruptcy cases and requires a substantial
interest of any kind, not merely a financial kind. Some particular nonpecuniary
interests should be provided a statutory right to be heard, such as those held by
employees who are facing job losses. Rather than articulating any other
particular type of interest that should be heard as a matter of right, we should
limit the contexts in which these other substantial but noneconomic interests
may be heard. Such interests should be heard only in major case events, such as
plan confirmation, the sale of all or substantially all of the debtor's assets, or the
rejection of an executor contract or unexpired lease.
With these limitations, the addition of these parties to the bankruptcy
bargaining table should not cause a significant increase in the cost of Chapter
11. Moreover, the additional costs of hearing these claims does not justify
ignoring them in any event.
The most difficult question posed by this Article is how best to address
these nonpecuniary interests once we permit them to be heard. I do not fully
answer this question in this Article, but instead explore a few of the many
options we may have in considering these interests. Although we ultimately
may decide to assign a dollar value to what we currently consider to be
nonpecuniary interests, and may even decide to elevate them to the status of a
bankruptcy "claim," we can start the process of recognizing these interests by
merely allowing them to be heard. Once this is accomplished, we can also take
these interests into account to the extent they do not interfere with existing
pecuniary rights. By hearing these concerns, can we inform ourselves about the
implications of Chapter 11 on our society. With this information in hand, we
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can make better judgments and decisions and create a more responsive legal
process.
Taking substantial noneconomic interests into account in major Chapter 11
cases is also economically efficient, measured over the long term, because it
preserves existing social, economic, and familial structures. Purely economic
models drastically underestimate the costs of displacement and make other
unrealistic assumptions. When these factors are adjusted, it costs less over the
long term to consider societal interests now.
In summary, we must recognize, weigh, and take responsibility for the
costs bankruptcy imposes on society. These costs must be spread more fairly.
We must be willing to neutralize conditions, built into the reorganization
system, which disadvantage innocent, noncreditor third parties. This can be
done by guaranteeing certain interests, such as employees with a prospect of
future employment, a voice in the proceeding. Conversely, a failure to provide
this and similar opportunities perpetuates a bankruptcy system that is out of
sync with the goals of the society in which it operates. This type of legal system
is not sustainable. To a large extent, society pays the costs of rehabilitation. In
repayment, the system should be accountable to the public and hear and
respond to society's broader needs.
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